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ABSTRACT
MILITARY OPERATION IN CHECHNYA 1994-96 AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE
RUSSIAN – TURKISH RELATIONS
Evgueni Outkine
M. A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Norman Stone
December 2004
This thesis analyzes the events directly related to military operations in Chechnya
1994-96. Factors leading to the conflict between the Federal Center and the Chechen
separatists such as Dudayev’s nationalist policy and the high level of criminality in
Chechnya will be discussed together with the effects that the conflict had on Russia’s
relations (official and unofficial) with Turkey – another state with strong historical ties
and interests in the Caucasus. The thesis will also study the Islamic factor as a linking
element between Turkey and the Caucasus, tracing the history and development of Islam
in both places, noting the radical Islamic groupings’ activities, and surveying the Turkish
mass-media approach towards the conflict.
iv
ÖZET
ÇEÇENİSTAN’DAKİ 1994-96 ASKERİ OPERASYON VE ONUN RUSYA –
TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİNİ ETKİLEMESİ
Evgueni Outkine
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Norman Stone
Aralık 2004
Bu tez Çeçenistan’daki 1994-96 arasındaki askeri operasyonlarla ilgili olayları
analiz etmektedir. Çeçen ayrılıkçılar ile Federal otorite arasındaki çatışmaya tesir eden
faktörlerden; Dudayev’in miiliyetçi siyaseti, Çeçenistan’daki yüksek suç oranı gibi
konular Rusya’nın (resmi ve gayriresmi) Türkiye ile – Kafkasya ile güçlü tarihi bağları
ve çıkarları olan başka bir devlet – olan ilişkilerine olan etkileri bu tez içinde
tartışılmaktadır. Tez aynı zamanda Türkiye’yi Kafkasya’ya bağlayan etmenlerden biri
olan İslami faktörü de inceleyerek, iki bölgeye İslamın gelişimi ve tarihini izleyip, radikal
İslami grupların faaliyetlerine atıfla, Türk medyasının Çeçen meselesine yaklaşımını
araştırmaktadır.
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1CHAPTER I
 INTRODUCTION
The role that the conflict in Chechnya played in the history of the Russian
Federation is difficult to overestimate. No doubt that the military operation in Chechnya
in 1994-96 was not less important for Russia than the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement
in 1991. That agreement put the end to the formerly mighty state owing the status of the
superpower under the name “USSR.” The Chechen conflict, on the other hand, was an
attempt to further disintegrate the successor of the USSR – the Russian Federation. In
some terms that attempt was successful and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, as
Chechnya was called by Chechen separatists got informal independence at least for a
short period. The results of that conflict were dreadful for the Russian Federation. The
authority of the Russian Government was undermined both within the country and
abroad. The population in the region where the military operations took place bore
enormous losses (almost 100.000 military and civilians citizens of the Russian
Federation: Russian, Chechen, and representatives of other nations got killed during the
conflict). How and why such a disaster for Russia happened were once perhaps the most
popular questions among well-known journalists, academics and politicians. They
dedicated numerous works to the Chechen conflict and tried to provide valid explanations
for the horrible process that led to the great number of casualties. After all those works,
the theme of this paper may now seem somewhat banal. Nevertheless, one more time the
attempt to look back in history to the events concerning Chechnya and trace the
2developments that led to the tragedy will be made. To provide this work with some
originality the stress will be made not on the already frequently discussed matters like the
course of military events or the well-known terrorist acts performed by Chechen militants
in Budennovsk and Kizlyar. Rather, some aspects that have been usually neglected by the
works dedicated to the Chechen conflict will be examined. One of such aspects is the
effect of the conflict in Chechnya on Russia’s relations with Turkey – the state having
strong historical ties with the Caucasus region and also having its own problems with
insurgent movements on its soil. Up to now very few works were dedicated to this
subject, so the main aim of this study is to shed more light on it and create a framework
for understanding how the Turkish side at both official and unofficial levels perceived the
Chechen separatists’ struggle and how that perception affected the Russo-Turkish
relations.
The thesis is divided into four main parts following the first chapter -
introduction. The second chapter introduces the reader to the situation in Chechnya
before its conflict with the Federal Center started, or, to be more precise, with Dudayev’s
separatist regime and the criminality that grew enormously after his coming to power in
the republic. While talking about the roots of the conflict many sources fail to see the
Dudayev’s regime as a catalyst. This chapter discusses it more deeply and there is also
some information about other Chechen leaders and their criminal activities in Chechnya
and outside it.
Chapters three and four are intended to explain why public opinion in Turkey was
so indignant at the decision of the Federal Center to employ forces against Dudayev. The
third chapter deals with the negative attitude of Russians and Turks towards each other
3and offers some reasons for that. The fourth chapter mentions the aspect of religion in the
conflict. It helps to trace the developments of Islam in Turkey and Chechnya, presents
some similarities in terms of Islamic extremism and demonstrates how the separatist
leaders used religious factor to achieve their goals.
The fifth chapter is dedicated to the coverage of the Chechen conflict by the
Turkish mass-media. It shows the general attitude of Turkish newspapers towards events
in Chechnya and describes their ways of presenting information to the public. It also
describes the so-called information war waged by the Chechen separatists in order to
affect the world community.
The sixth chapter describes Russian-Turkish relations during the conflict. It is the
core part of the thesis dealing with an aspect of the Chechen crisis that has not received
much publicity so far. Stress is laid on Turkey’s approach, divided into two levels: the
official - statements of Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pacts, agreements and other
official documents concerning the conflict in Chechnya; and unofficial – all other acts
that had not been authorized by the Turkish cabinet but nevertheless took place.
Concerning the unofficial level this chapter reviews the activities of the pro-separatist
NGOs acting on Turkish soil and their connections with the separatist leaders, while the
description of the official level concentrates on the reaction of the Turkish cabinet to the
events in Chechnya and the significance of these events for Turkish-Russian affairs. This
chapter also shows how Russia and Turkey being two states that had their own interests
in the Caucasian region had serious problems in their relations, and how being at the
same time as states that had  similar problems with separatist movements Turkey and
Russia demonstrated mutual understanding and willingness to cooperate.
4Certainly, this work does not claim to be the last word in the evaluation of the
Chechen crisis and the roles of some well-known figures in it. Its primary task is to reveal
some previously unknown facts and details relating to the 1994-96 events in Chechnya
or, as it is usually said, show the other side of the coin that may seem quite different to
those who were following those events mainly from the Turkish sources.
5CHAPTER II
 SITUATION IN THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC PRIOR TO THE CONFLICT
2.1 Elements of criminality in Chechnya
Some elements of criminality in Chechnya have deep historical roots. As soon as
the first settlers from the inner parts of Russia settled in the Caucasus they became the
targets of abrek (bandit of honor in mountaineers’ understanding) raids. Raids were not
invented by Chechens, of course. In the past, the Moscow Rus’ suffered greatly from the
Don and Volga Cossaks, who for several centuries complicated her foreign policy
contacts with the southern neighbors by raiding foreign merchants, robbing vessels on the
Black Sea and selling slaves.1 Raids as a side trade are a well-known fact in the history of
humankind and many nations had similar pages in the past. However, it is another matter
that it seldom remained the basic source of income for such a long time as in the North
Caucasus. According to historical accounts, when the Russian General Rumiantsev
demanded from the Chechens that the raids be stopped, he was told “Our business is to
raid and rob, while yours is to grow grain and trade.”2 That banditry was not only allowed
but also even admired among Chechens is also demonstrated by neutral observers such as
Sebastian Smith, who in his book about Chechnya noted:
A convenient myth exists that when God dished out riches throughout the world,
he forgot the Caucasus, and realizing this error, allowed the peoples there to go
their neighbors and take what they needed…A family whose men were brave
                                                
1 T. Barret, Lines of Uncertainty: The frontiers of the North Caucasus, (Slavic Review, Vol. 54, Issue 3), p.
588
2 http://en.rian.ru/rian/pdf_store/chechnya-eng/section02.pdf
6during raids and successful at stealing horses, sheep and other riches under fire,
was a family with honor.”3
and the well-known historian John Baddeley, who himself visited the region at the end of
the 19’th century and wrote:
Cattle-lifting, highway robbery, and murder were, in this strange code, counted
deeds of honour; they were openly instigated by the village maiden – often, by the
way, remarkably pretty – who scorned any pretender having no such claims to her
favour; and these, together with fighting against any foe, but especially the hated
Russian, were the only pursuits deemed worthy of a grown man.4
Do the examples presented above mean that Chechens overall are more prone to
criminality than any other nation? Certainly not, but very often among them there were
groups that tried to use every opportunity to get easy earnings by criminal means. Such
an opportunity was created for them by the regime of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the ex-Soviet
general, who through so-called elections actually usurped the power in September 1991.
His election was a sort of farce when as John Dunlop writes “…in some districts, the
number of registered voters, and in the ballot boxes which were placed out in the town
squares packets of ballots allegedly filled out by representatives of the Chechen diaspora
were put into the voting urns. Moreover, neither the Ingush, nor a part of the Russian-
language populace in the republic had participated in the election.5 Prior to the
“elections” the gang of armed people formed by Dudayev and called “National Guard”
dissolved the provisional council and occupied its building. Thus, it was in fact the self-
proclamation but not the election of Dudayev’s presidency. The same farce was with the
parliamentary elections. Later the chairman of the electoral committee Khadzhiyev and
his assistant Kerimov publicly acknowledged the falsification of the elections. According
                                                
3 Sebastian Smith, Allah’s Mountains: Politics and War in Russia’s Caucasus, (New York: I.B. Tauris,
1998), p. 14
4 John F. Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (Longman, London, 1908), p. xxxvii
7to Yusup Soslambekov (one of the OKChN leaders) Dudayev took his relatives and other
people close to him into the parliament although they had not got a sufficient number of
votes.6 Additionally, many of them had a criminal background. For instance, Umayev, a
member of the Chechen National Security Committee, was under examination on a
charge of juvenile rape; Labazanov, the former Head of Dudayev’s security, had served a
term in prison for murder; others such as Akhmadov, Udugov, Gantemirov and
Dzhabrailov previously were also under charges of criminal activities.7
After coming to power, Dudayev immediately started pursuing nationalist and
separatist policies. They were very popular at the time following the dissolution of the
USSR and many political figures used them for gaining popularity. Dudayev did this to a
large extent. The well-known lawyer Nikolai Grammatikov wrote:
The Chechen leaders skillfully used the sentiments of national revival (neglected
during the Soviet era) in their own interests and for their own benefits. Using the
long-standing idea that Moscow was getting everything out of the regions and
republics, while giving nothing back, Dudayev stressed in his propaganda the
potential prosperity of Chechnya if the Chechens decided to secede from Russia.8
What made Dudayev different from other nationalist-politicians all over the post-
Soviet Union was his personal enmity towards Russia and its leaders. Anatol Lieven
writes: “Dudayev was raving that ‘Russism is worse even than Nazism,’ that ‘Boris
Yeltsin was the leader of a gang of murderers’ and that his regime was the ‘diabolical
heir of the totalitarian monster.”9 There may be various explanations as to why a former
Soviet general, who served for a long time in the Soviet military, who had a Russian wife
                                                                                                                                                
5 John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 114
6 Dzhabrail Gakayev, “Put’ k Chechenskoy revolyutsii,” in Chechnya I Rossiya: Obshchestva i
gosudarstva, ed. Dmitri Furman (Moscow: Polinform-Talburi, 1999),  footnote 29
7 “Tverskaya, 13,” 2-8 May, 1996
8 Nikolai Grammatikov, “The Russian Intervention in Chechnya in December 1994: Issues and Decision-
Making,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies (Vol. 11, No. 4, December 1998), p. 118
8and consequently half-Russian children, who spoke Russian better than Chechen became
filled with such hatred towards Russia. This question should be addressed to
psychologists rather than historians and journalists. Still, Lieven’s opinion that not being
really a Chechen in the full sense Dudayev “had to present himself as a 200 per cent
Chechen nationalist by way of compensation” seems true.10
Whatever the reason, Dudayev tried his best to provoke the anti-Russian attitude
among the radically oriented Chechen groups. All former grievances were recalled: Mass
emigration (muhacirlik) to Turkey after the end of the more than half century long
Caucasian war between imperial Russia and Shamil’s murids. Than there was deportation
to Northern Kazakhstan in 1944 by Stalin’s order. All these made some criminal groups
think that it was time for revenge and revolution. But this time it was not the classical
struggle between haves and have-nots, it was rather the situation when bandits were
taking the belongings from the ethnical minorities – Russians, Cossacks, Armenians.
Chechen criminal groups simply decided that instead of trying to resolve disputes with
the representatives of other nations by peaceful means the use of force was simpler,
cheaper and fully coincided with customary norms of abrek-style living. Slogans like “Ne
pokupaite domov u Sashi i Mashi, oni vse ravno budut vashi!” (Do not buy flats from
Sashas and Mashas, they would be yours anyway) started appearing more and more
often. That illegal expropriation of property and oppressing the Russian-speaking
population did not receive popular support from the Chechen intelligentsiya but was
approved by the less educated and, thus, more prone to be influenced by Dudayev’s anti-
Russian propaganda, were the people from the countryside. As Smith wrote “Dudayev
                                                                                                                                                
9 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of the Russian Power, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1998), p. 69
9discovered that setting his countrymen against the Russian bogeyman was the key to his
popularity.”11 By portraying Russia and the Russians as enemy No 1 for the Chechens
Dudayev encouraged violence towards the Russian – speaking minority in Chechnya. As
Dunlop also writes:
The “anti-imperial” campaign waged against Moscow by the Chechen mass
media also served to stimulate a negative attitude toward the Russian populace on
a day-to-day level. The growing crime rate in the republic began to take on a
”national selective character,” especially in the area of housing, where some
Russian homes were directly seized. Leading representatives of the Russian-
language populace in Chechnya were murdered: for example, university rector
Kan-Kalik; Dean Udodov; Judge Samsonova; an official of the cabinet of
ministers San’ko; a correspondent for the press service “Express-Chronicle,”
Krikor’yants, and “many others.”12
That many Russian families and individuals did indeed become targets of bandits
was difficult to deny and that was reflected in the works of journalists who wrote on early
90-s Chechnya. For instance, Sebastian Smith stated that “it was invariably Russians who
became crime victims in Chechnya.”13 Smith went on writing that Russians “faced
constant harassment, or were even forced from their apartments and robbed and killed.”14
Then he gives a vivid example of that harassment: “One elderly Russian pensioner in
Grozny, known by everyone as tyotya or “auntie” Natasha, was paid a visit by young
Chechens at her tiny cottage in central Grozny. When the youths found nothing better to
take, they ripped out her gold teeth.15 Those were only singular examples of the
harassment of Russians by Chechen criminal gangs and there were a lot of others that did
not receive exposure in the printed editions. Later, however, many people that fled from
                                                                                                                                                
10 Ibid
11 S. Smith, Allah’s......, p.128
12 J. Dunlop, Russia......, p. 137
13 S. Smith, Allah’s......, p. 27
14 Ibid, p. 133
15 Ibid, p. 134
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Chechnya to other places in Russia or abroad started writing their memoirs about their
living in Dudayev’s Chechnya. Here, for instance, a paragraph from the letter of a
Chechen woman Dina, who left Chechnya in 1994:
From 1991, the "black people" did start to descend the mountains and to flood the
capital of Chechnya where I lived. They came to join Dudaev's group which was very
small first. Most of the 'rebels' were the social or criminal outcasts. The inmates of the
two jails of Grozny were also released. So the city was swarming with armed and bearded
men with the most disgusting and evil-looking mugs. Fear and despair settled in our
souls. We couldn't believe it was really happening, and had a feeling that it had to be a
horrible dream and something would awake us soon and we would sigh with relief... The
situation was developing and worsening. However, nobody and nothing woke us up. The
ruling gangs did what they wanted: kidnapped people, including kids, for ransoms,
abducted women, spread narcotics, tortured and killed whomever they chose.16
Perhaps the only publication that concentrated mainly on that issue was the book
“Kriminal’ny rezhim” which comprised documents assembled by the public affairs
departments of the FSK, MVD and Defense Ministry, and letters from the people whose
fundamental rights were violated in Chechnya. Some Western journalists, however,
treated that material with doubts. John Dunlop, for example, wrote that “it obviously
constituted disinformation.”17 Nevertheless, even Dudayev himself acknowledged the
acts of banditry but, “blamed it on Russian provocateurs – nothing to do with him.”18
Anyway, the result of this “criminal nationalism” in Chechnya was that starting
from 1992, 220.000 Russian-speaking people left Chechnya.19 However, things did not
go better for Chechnya after that. On the contrary, the industrial enterprises left without
labor stopped and the republic started sinking deeper and deeper into economic crisis.
The prosperity that would come after the secession from Russia according to Duayev’s
                                                
16 Letter published in AltChechnya@yahoogroups.com, 13.05.2004
17 J. Dunlop, Russia......, p. 138
18 S. Smith, Allah’s......, p. 133
19 Alexander Halmuhammedov, "Religiozno-politicheskiy konflikt v Chechenskoy Respublike Ichkeriya,"
Central Asia and the Caucasus (No. 4, 2000)
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promises did not come. The economy in Chechnya in Smith’s words “went into terminal
decline, and a new class of biznesmen took over the government, while cut throats took
over the streets.”20 True, failing to accomplish his promise that Chechens would drink
camel milk from golden taps, Dudayev decided that the only solution was to allow illegal
means of earning money.
Instead of dealing with socio-economic troubles Dudayev seemed to be
deliberately making them worse. For example, while unemployment was skyrocketing in
the republic he declared that Chechen girls need not go to school after three years and
boys after seven.21 The horrible situation in which Chechnya found itself during the
Dudayev’s regime could be described by Smith, who wrote “There was a minister of
economics, but no economy, a foreign minister, but no diplomatic recognition, mountains
of presidential decrees on law and order, but only the rule of the gun.”22 Another Western
journalist David Remnick wrote:
Dudayev showed no resistance to the criminality around him. He seemed to
encourage it. He installed several of his relatives in key positions where bribe-
taking was endemic – the managements of the main city market and the major
banks, for instance. Many of his personal guards and flunkies were ex-cons who
had been freed from prison in a general amnesty declared after the collapse of the
Soviet Union.23
So, not surprisingly Chechnya became what a Russian deputy minister Sergei
Shakhrai called “a free economic-criminal zone.”24 Illegal trade flourished. More than
hundred unsanctioned flights hauling contraband and outlaws were made to and from the
airport in Grozny. The old Caucasian tradition of raiding was also recalled in the 90-s
                                                                                                                                                
20 S. Smith, Allah’s......, p. 129
21 Ibid
22 Ibid
23 David Remnick, Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia, (Vintage Books,  1998), p. 274
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Chechnya when cargo trains traveling through Chechnya were continuously robbed.
Production of counterfeit currency hugely increased. As a result, Chechen people had to
either leave their homeland under Dudayev as did 650.000 Chechens who left for other
regions in the Russian Federation or stay and live according to the criminal laws.
Chechen criminal groups were not limited to act only within their republic. Their
activities took place in other cities in the Russian Federation and especially in Moscow.
Later the Russian politicians would call it as the “Chechen export of criminality to
Russia.” Actually, the first criminal groups had appeared in the Russian capital even
before Dudayev took over Chechnya but they received considerable reinforcement and
their activities became more organized when the latter came to power in the republic.
Due to the high rate of unemployment in Chechnya many young people fled from their
homes in pursue of wealth and power to Moscow where they would be welcomed by
their fellows being on the way to becoming a formidable criminal power in Moscow.
Their leaders were strong and ambitious - Movladi Atlangeriyev, Nikolai Suleimanov,
Lechi Altimirov and Hozh-Akhmet Nukhayev. The last one is perhaps the most
prominent figure among other Chechen criminal leaders. His colorful career has been the
subject of documentaries shown at international film festivals, including the Dutch "The
Making of a New Empire" by Joseph de Putter, and the Polish "The Real Godfather" by
Macron Mammon.25 British film-maker Frederick Forsyth was so inspired by Nukhayev
that he took him as a prototype for his documentary film about the Russian mafia
                                                                                                                                                
24 Ibid, p. 273
25 From EURASIA INSIGHT, September 14, 2001
(http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/a3f57b7c84bc9c61c1256ac700480731?OpenDocument)
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“Icon.”26 Later Nukhayev was appointed by Dudayev as head of Intelligence Service in
Chechnya and following Dudayev’s death became the first vice-Prime Minister in
Yandarbiyev’s government. In 1999 he would create and become the leader of the
nationalist movement “Nokhchi-Latta-Islam” with headquarters in Baku.
Nukhayev’s previous activities, however, were quite far away from politics.
Starting from the late 80-s he was one of the leaders of the organized criminal group
called “Chechenskaya obshchina” (Chechen community) that made its money mainly by
offering protection or as it is called krysha (roof) for businessmen and levying taxes on
traders in markets. In the late 80-s and early 90-s when the country was experiencing the
transition from central planning to the market economy and private business, like
mushrooms after the rain there emerged various gangs that carried on their own criminal
business. The well-known gangs that competed with each other for control over parts of
Moscow were Solntsevskaya, Balashihinskaya, Lyuberetskaya, Orehovskaya,
Taganskaya and others. Chechenskaya obshchina managed to press them all. One of its
main characteristics was the refusal to live according to the established criminal rules.
The representatives of the obshchina did not participate in the vorovskaya skhodka
(gathering of criminal authorities) in Dagomys where all major criminal gangs divided
their sphere of influence in Moscow. Prior to the meeting Chechens told the participants
that they would take their piece of the Moscow cake anyway and did not want to bind
themselves with any agreement. Chechens supported their words with actions and soon
obshchina became well known in Moscow for its decisiveness in criminal actions and
extremism in dealing with opponents. Especially revealing was obshchina’s defeat of
                                                
26 Ibid
14
Baumanskaya gang when all leaders of baumantsy were killed or wounded in the sudden
assault by Chechens in the restaurant “Labirint.”
Moreover, compared to other illegal groupings, Chechen gangs in Moscow
enjoyed far greater protection from the high level officials. Some analysts would relate
that solely to the strong relative ties between ethnic Caucasians, but according to a
journalist well-known in the area of criminology, Nikolai Modestov, more than family
connections were at work. Modestov stated that the Chechen criminal groups were
deliberately treated too leniently by the Moscow police forces because the latter wanted
to use Chechens as an effective antidote against the Slavic brigady (illegal groupings).27
However, that treatment had very dangerous by-effects and replacing the Slavic groups
from the domineering positions of the Moscow criminal world with Chechenskaya
obshchina did not reduce the headache of the Moscow police but made it even worse.
The Chechen mafia was known not only for its martial “toughness.” It was the
first criminal organization, which started using financial machinations. Their really
pioneering criminal activity of using the irregularities of numerous Russian banks and
exchanging fake bank bills (or aviso) for hard cash cost the Russian Ministry of Finance
more than 3 billion $! The biggest part of that money was soon transferred to the “free
economic zone” in Chechnya where no one could control it. Not only the money but also
its criminal owners could escape to Chechnya as well. The direct relationship between the
Chechen mafia in Moscow and Dudayev’s criminal regime was demonstrated when
Nukhayev being under arrest was rescued by Dudayev’s men. Not only the leaders but
also rank-and-file members of “obshchina” in the case of emergency could easily find a
safe-haven in Chechnya where among the “colleagues” they would be treated as national
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heroes. When the military conflict was about to start the majority of them joined
Dudayev’s forces. According to Lieven they did not even try to hide their criminal
background. Describing his talk with one of the Dudayev’s boyeviks during the war
Lieven wrote that to the question what his interlocutor’s previous occupation had been he
got this answer. “Oh, I was a racketeer in Moscow, and I suppose when this is all over,
insh’allah, I shall go back to my racket.”28 Another Chechen talking to Lieven boasted
that he previously had gone to Moscow “to work as a bandit,” and now he was still a
bandit but a bandit for his country.29 But apart from the Chechens Grozny became a
shelter for the criminals of different origins. Modestov wrote that more than 1200 people
who were suspected of committing grave crimes could escape in the capital of Chechnya.
In Rostov-na-Donu, Makhachkala, Mineral’nye Vody terrorists having been trained and
instructed in Grozny took hostages and got ransom.30
2.3 Decision to make use of armed forces in Chechnya
Thus, starting from 1991 under Dudayev’s regime Chechnya became a semi-
independent state drowned in criminality where the Russian-speaking population was
oppressed. The existence of such a troublesome region on the territory of the Russian
Federation for a relatively long period without interference from the Federal center was
to a great extent owing to the lack of attention from above. Russia suffering the hard
outcome of the disintegration of the USSR was itself in unrest. Several struggles at the
very top of the government distracted attention from Chechnya for some time and the
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process of finding a solution to that problem was delayed. And when finally the Federal
cabinet was deliberate to deal with the Chechen issue it became clear that those who
benefited from Chechnya’s being a “free economic-criminal zone” would not give up
their cozy positions easily and some radical methods had to be applied.
About the necessity of military operation there existed and still exist many
opinions. At times Yeltsin was offered some alternative decisions, including economic
blockade of the most radical regions in Chechnya, support of the Chechen opposition and
finally negotiations with Dudayev.31 The last option, however, was the least achievable.
Dudayev’s aggressive populist national-Islamic policy gave a rise to establishment of
various extremist groupings who were eager to go beyond Dudayev’s aims with arms.
For them the movement towards the full independence of Chechnya first and the whole
Caucasus afterwards was irreversible. When Dudayev finally realized how dangerous
game he was playing it was too late. Rather than a strong leader Dudayev reminded an
apprentice sorceror who let the genie out of the bottle but, being unable to control it, fell
prey to it. A good example of that is Dudayev’s conversation with the Federal Minister of
Defence Pavel Grachev in Nazran in December 1994. When the Federal troops were
already advancing towards Chechnya Grachev made a last effort to avoid bloodshed and
during a private meeting asked Dudayev if there were any possibility to resolve the
conflict by peaceful means. Dudayev, pointing at the Chechens waiting outside said:
“You don’t know these people. If I go and tell them that I am ready to look for a political
solution they’ll simply shoot us both and find someone more resolute instead of me.”32
“Those people” to whom Dudayev referred were Yandarbiyev, Udugov, Basayev and
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other Chechen radicals that were associated with the uprisings in Chechnya. Later on they
would unite with Islamic fundamentalists coming to Chechnya from abroad, adopt their
ideology and following Dudayev’s death become the core of the separatists’ resistance.
Moreover, on the Federal side not everyone was in favor of the peaceful
resolution either. The warlike sentiments in the Kremlin became particularly strong after
the unsuccessful storm of Grozny by the Chechen opposition on November 26 when
Dudayev’s militants managed to destroy a huge part of Federal vehicles provided to
reinforce the opposition. Some federal leaders including Yeltsin took that as a personal
offence and became determined to punish the separatist leader. Especially keen on that
idea were the Federal “power” ministers (Minister of Security S. Stepashin and Minister
of Internal affairs V. Yerin), who together with some other prominent figures in the
Federal government like N. Yegorov, O. Soskovets, M. Barsukov, O. Lobov and A.
Korzhakov formed the so-called “party of war,” promising Yeltsin to bring the rebellious
Chechen Republic and its leader Dudayev to its knees in a very short period if Federal
military troops were employed. Thus, Yeltsin preferred to cut the Gordian knot, rather
than to try to untie it and soon military actions began in full scope.
Apart from the result of the military campaign also important was how the world
community would react to that. Especially important for Russia was the reaction of
Turkey, which among Russian political circles was regarded as an important partner in
the future and at the same time as the possible contender for the influence in the
Caucasian region.
18
2.4 Possible effects of the military conflict on Russian–Turkish relations
Those who saw Turkey as a rival based their ideas mainly on geopolitical matters.
The Cold War had finished quite recently and Turkey as the partner of the United States
in the NATO alliance still did not cause much trust among them. Especially suspicious
about Turkey’s real intentions were the Russian military commanders. Even when the
USSR possessed the largest army and the biggest amount of the conventional weapons in
the world, the Soviet military leaders very respectfully evaluated the military potential of
the Turkish army, which according to Felgenhauer was “well armed, well disciplined,
arduous in battle, large numerically, with good knowledge of the natural environment of
the future theatre of war, and careful in logistical requirements (unlike other Western
militaries).”33 And, Felgenhauer continues, “[a]s the Soviet Union collapsed, Moscow's
military staffs saw the Turkish military as becoming even more dangerous. By 1993, the
General Staff in Moscow understood that it had no conventional capability to stop a
possible Turkish military intervention if the many post-Soviet conflicts in the Trans-
Caucasus got out of hand.”34
During the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh in 1993 those fears were very close to
being justified. The Russian border guards, which carried out missions for protection of
the frontiers of the former CIS republics in the Caucasus and were backed by Russian
army units in the rear, were considered by the Turkish military leaders as a potential
threat to the sovereignty of those republics and even Turkey itself. So, in June 1993 the
Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish armed forces, Doğan Güreş, told reporters that
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19
"Russia has become a very serious threat...Russia is continuing its traditional tsarist
imperial policies...Russian divisions are on our border," and so on.35 This radical mood of
the Turkish generals was also transmitted by the Turkish government. As the Armenian
offensive in Nagorny Karabakh developed, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller spoke
publicly of the possibility of war with Armenia (knowing that its borders were guarded
by the Russian units) if the Armenian advance was not checked. And on 6 September
1993, Russian border-guards on the Turkish-Armenian border were fired on from Turkish
soil.36 Although military conflict was avoided it left an unpleasant image as to Russian –
Turkish relations in the Caucasus. And only a little more than one year later there was
again a military conflict with the direct involvement of the Russian military forces. In
spite of the fact that the military action went on entirely within Russian territory and was
not in immediate proximity to the Turkish state frontiers, that Turkey would not remain
the simple observer during that conflict was obvious. At least the fact, that mentioned
above Doğan Güreş's mother was Chechen and he himself reportedly could talk Chechen
did not provide any grounds for optimism.37 And taking into consideration the tensions
on the Turkish-Armenian border, the perspective of a further worsening of the relations
between the two states seemed quite possible. That is why Turkey’s perception of the
conflict in Chechnya was of crucial importance for the Russian Federal Center.
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According to David Gudiashvili, what troubled Turkey the most was the
possibility that the conflict would spread to the entire Caucasus.38 Indeed, the Caucasus
represented a place where various confrontations were doomed to happen. The bloody
images of ethnical conflicts in early 90-s between Armenians and Azerbaijanis,
Abkhazians and Georgians, Ossetians and Ingush were still alive in the minds of the
inhabitants of the Caucasian region. And the worst thing was that all those conflicts were
only temporarily frozen but not resolved. So the entire Caucasus could be compared to a
bomb with detonator ready to explode from a single spark. That spark could easily have
been the conflict in Chechnya. Dudayev and his aids many times repeated that “Chechnya
is fighting on behalf of all the Caucasian peoples” and appealed to the Caucasian
republics to help Chechnya and rise against both Russia and “your own cowardly and
corrupt leaders.”39 Although, as it turned out, other Caucasian republics were wise
enough not to be deceived by those provocative statements of Chechen leaders, according
to Gudiashvili, some Western analysts at that time were quite alarmed by the possibility
that a full-scale war might envelop other North Caucasian republics.40
Certainly, that could not be the desirable outcome for Turkey and like everyone
else it was alarmed by such a possibility. According to press reports the Turkish
government came to the following conclusion: “We are afraid that the spread of the
conflict that has already enveloped the entire Caucasus may turn the region into another
Yugoslavia…Everything that is going on in the Caucasus is evoking a direct and serious
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response in Turkey.”41 To what extent that response would be direct and serious the
Turkish government was still to decide. Now it had to deal with a serious dilemma: on
the one hand, it had to be sensitive to public opinion in Turkey, which was demonstrating
open sympathy to rebellious Chechnya, on the other, it really did not want to spoil the
relations with Russia, which was Turkey’s second largest trade partner. As a result,
Turkey’s approach towards the Chechen issue was quite an ambiguous one. In order to
understand it better it should divided into two levels: the official one, which tells what
actually was done by the Turkish government concerning the Chechen question, and the
unofficial, involving everything else that not being sanctioned by the Turkish authorities
nevertheless took place. And each of those levels must be viewed separately.
The unofficial level was mostly represented by the numerous public organizations
supporting the Chechen side and carrying out their activities on the Turkish territory. The
activities of those organizations and the organizations themselves will be discussed in the
next chapter, but now it is more important to understand why those organizations enjoyed
vast support from the Turkish population. Here we must review the attitude of Turks and
Russians towards each other from the side of historical perspective.
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CHAPTER III
  HISTORICAL ENMITY AND THE NEGATIVE IMAGES OF TURKS AND
RUSSIANS
3.1 Historical Background
Viewed in historical retrospect, Russian-Turkish relations can hardly be described
as friendly. These two states have often been the rivals for domination in the Balkans,
Caucasus, Black Sea and other regions. Although they have always remained neighbors
the history of their relations was to a greater extent represented by military conflicts than
trade. Actually, if we compare the periods of the Russo – Turkish conflict with the
duration of numerous wars in Europe, in which Russia also took part, the time of warfare
between Russia and Turkey looks quite short. As was once wittily remarked by former
Turkish President Süleyman Demirel, these two states have been at war “only for some
50 years out of over 500” and some historians even affirm that truly serious
confrontations have taken only about 25 years.42 However, even in that short time Russia
and Turkey fought each other fiercely. In the wars between Russia and Turkey not only
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geopolitical gains were at stake but an ideological matter as well. Russians and Turks
were rarely inclined to give each other quarter or benefit of the “courtesies of war,”
believing as they did that the cause of religious truth itself was at stake in the struggle
between Christianity and Islam. That was why Russo-Turkish wars were always
distinguished by the enormous number of undeniable atrocities committed by both sides.
The descriptions of the horror of wars can be found not only in Russian or Turkish
sources that frequently used to portray each other as merciless barbarians ready to
slaughter everyone at hand but also in books written by Western authors.
3.2 Influence of Western sources
Actually, the Western writers also did very much in their works to create the
negative images of both sides. In many books devoted to the Russo-Turkish wars the
stress is made on the ugly moments of warfare. For instance, Fuller provides an example
of the Russian atrocities by describing the storming the Turkish fortress of Ochakov by
the Russians:
After the successful storm the victorious army was allowed to loot, rape, and
murder for three days. The frenzied Russian troops killed at least 10.000 Turkish
men, women, and children in the course of this outrage. Even more macabre,
since the suspension of discipline precluded organizing proper burial parties, most
of the corpses froze solid where they lay and remained contorted in icy agony
until the following spring.43
Or just the opposite example can be revealed from Glazebrook, who describes a
historical episode of Turkish brutality to a Russian soldier during the war between Russia
and Turkey in the late nineteenth century:
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The battle was at its thickest and hottest, when three Turkish soldiers pushed a
wounded Russian officer back from the parapet, and followed him over it to
dispatch him with their bayonets. Major Teesdale, seeing this act of barbarity,
vaulted over the breastwork, cut down the foremost Turk with his sword, and
called on the Russian, in French, to surrender as a prisoner of war44.
Besides showing the historical stereotypes of Turkish cruelty and brutality, some
Western sources sometimes portrayed Turks as main antagonists in the scenes of
genocide, massacre or ethnic cleansing which are supposed to have happened during the
First World War and after. The image of Turks massacring Greeks, Armenians and Kurds
during the early decades of the century is implicit or explicit in many detective novels
and thrillers in the twentieth century. For example, it is discussed in “The Orient
Express” (1922), “The Mask of Dimitrios” (1939), “Pascali's Island” (1980), “On the
Shores of the Mediterranean” (1984), and “In Xanadu: A Quest” (1989). Almost all those
works were translated into Russian and presented to the Russian public thus
strengthening the belief among the people that the lust to massacre Christians was in the
blood of every Turk.
3.3 National prejudices
3.3.1 Images of Turks in Russia
Even without the Western influence Russia had long ago shared the popular
antipathy toward the “Savage Turk” because in Russian literature as well as in history
there are more than a few stories of how the two nations stunned the world with the
thunder of bloody fighting. For instance, the film Geroi Shipki (The Heroes of Shipka)
1954 fully corresponded to that trend. In the lives of ordinary Russians, too, stories about
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warlike Turks have been passed down from generation to generation. So, what kind of
image would arise in the mind of an ordinary Russian, who was educated in the schools
where he studied the history interpreted by Russian historians? Russians always study the
18th century Russo-Ottoman wars and the brilliant victories of Suvorov, Rumiantsev and
Ushakov over Turkish sultans and pashas. Affected by all these Russians would imagine
Turks as men with the red fez on their heads, black thick moustaches and barbarous
looks, and refer to them using the humiliating words “busurmanin” or “churka” (the
latter term used also for all swarthy people in Caucasus and Central Asia). The word
“turok” would gain the meaning of “enemy” in the Russian language.
3.3.2 Images of Russians in Turkey
On the other hand, Turkish literature and folklore does not lack negative feelings
about Russians as well, and similar expressions used to portray Russians disapprovingly
can be found in the Turkish language. For instance, their proverb “Domuzdan post,
Rustan dost olmaz” (there can’t be fur from a pig, there can’t be friend from a Russian)
clearly explains the attitude of a Turk towards his Slavic neighbor. The word “moskof”
used for describing Russians became its counterpart for “turok”. And Turks also have
their own history. For instance, they always emphasize the battle of the Pruth River when
Peter the Great, surrounded and forced to surrender by the Ottomans, hardly escaped with
his army, let off easily by Grand Vezir Baltaci Mehmed Paşa due to bribes, causing the
Grand Vizier to be executed afterwards. That historical episode caused many speculations
among Turks making them assume (without any proof though) that Peter was allowed to
escape because the Tsaritsa Catherine I spent the night with Mehmet Paşa. This
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speculation is very popular among Turks and it further spoils the image of Russians in
Turkey, picturing them as people ready to use even their wives in achieving the goals. At
the same time Russians although naturally refusing to accept the Mehmet Paşa case
usually refer to Turks as sexually obsessed men ready to give up everything in order to
get a woman in their bed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the flow of prostitutes
from the ex-Soviet republics to Istanbul and other cities just strengthened both images.
Turkish newspapers usually did not economize on space on their pages to produce stories
ın which prostitutes from the former USSR or “Natashas,” as they are known in Turkish
were involved. Journalists did not bother themselves to get into the details, so they put
label the “Natasha” on all prostitutes be they Ukrainian, Moldavian, Georgian, or
Romanian so that in the process they become instantly “Russified” and thus create the
idea that Russia was a sort of exporter of prostitution to Turkey. As correctly mentioned
by Hakan Aksay (correspondent for the Turkish TV channel NTV) such an idea was not
only “extremely harmful to the lucrative suitcase trade, on which many in Istanbul have
long depended” it also had “a damaging social dimension” especially for those who were
married to Russian women and had children from such marriages.45 Unfortunately, lack
of knowledge and prejudices emanating from the historical background did really much
for Turks and Russians to make the task of explaining and describing each other more
difficult.
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CHAPTER IV
 THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN TURKISH SUPPORT FOR THE CHECHEN
SEPARATISTS
4.1 Historical significance of Islam in Turkey 
Another factor in the antipathy of Turks and Russians towards each other was
religion. As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the main features of the Russo –
Turkish antagonism was the struggle between the two religions: Christianity and Islam.
The predecessor of the Turkish state, the Ottoman Empire was the sole Islamic state on
the scene of European warfare, thus Ottomans considered themselves as the only
defenders of the Prophet Muhammad’s precepts against the gavurs [infidels] from the
West and North. At the same time the Russian Empire, the most powerful Orthodox state
in the world, often felt her responsibility for the fate of the Balkan peoples (Bulgarians,
Serbians, Macedonians, Greeks), who like the Russians were Orthodox Christians but
lived under the rule of the Muslim Ottomans. That caused definite tensions between
Russia and Turkey that ended up with the Russo – Ottoman war of 1877-78. It is hardly
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true that religion was the primary reason for the opposition between the two empires in
the Balkans but quite often the military actions of the Russian army were accompanied by
proclamations of the necessity to free the Orthodox peoples from the Ottoman yoke. On
the other hand, during the Crimean War (1853-56) the Ottomans had tried to establish
cooperation with the already mentioned Imam Shamil, who at the times was leading the
Muslim North Caucasians into war against the Tsarist Russia. Expecting help from the
Ottomans in his ghazavat [war against infidels], Shamil held the Ottoman sultan in the
highest esteem, as the head of the Islamic world. “There is,’ said Shamil to a Russian
officer, ‘only one God in Heaven and one padishah on earth – the Ottoman sultan.46
In the 20th century the religion-based struggle between the two states virtually
disappeared because both states underwent serious reconstruction. The Bolshevik
Revolution in Russia drastically changed social norms and established a regime where
religion had no role. Cathedrals and churches were destroyed and clerics were murdered
or sent to exile. Any attempts to revive religious feelings among the people were
prosecuted. As a result, religion was completely removed from the state level and did not
appear again until the early 90s.
A similar process was done in the Ottoman Empire. After it was dissolved the role
of the religion in the new established Turkish state was diminished by its first president
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who after the revolution in 1923 abolished the Khalifat (1924)
and proclaimed that Turkey was a secular republic (1937). Atatürk launched several
reforms directed at further undermining the influence of Islam like changing the Alphabet
from Arabic to Latin, he abolished the Sharia courts and the post of Sheikh–Ul–Islam,
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moved the official holiday from Friday to Sunday, adopted the European style of clothes,
etc. However, unlike the Bolshevik leaders, Atatürk did not harass the clergy, did not
destroy mosques, and did not persecute Turkish people for their religious views. In other
words, although Atatürk diminished the role of Islam and took it under state control, he
did not try to entirely destroy the religious roots that were quite deep in the lives of
ordinary Turks.
The role of Islam was strengthened in the forthcoming years. After the death of
Atatürk his successors deviated somewhat from the former’s tough attitude towards
Islam. The political parties (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi and Demokrat Partisi) that came to
power in Turkey in late 40s – 50s both acknowledged the historically important role of
Islam in Turkish society and that the Turkish government should assist the people in their
religious lives.47 Consequently, the pressure by the state on the various religious
foundations was loosened, and favorable conditions for the spreading of the Islamic ideas
in the country were created. With the government’s consent new İmam-Hatib schools
were opened and additional courses of Koran study introduced. Later, Islam gradually
returned to political life as well when new significant Islamic figures such as Necmettin
Erbakan, Recai Kutan, Melih Gökçek and Recep Tayip Erdoğan appeared on the Turkish
political scene. The party Erbakan founded (National Order Party) was to be banned
several times and forced to dissolve but it would almost immediately re-emerge under a
different name (National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party) and continue to
attract the votes of a large religiously oriented public in Turkey. Starting from the early
1970-s political parties headed by Erbakan and his followers would always be a political
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power that their opponents had to reckon with.48 It is worth mentioning that the peak of
growth of activity of Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey coincided with events in
Chechnya. In March 1994 the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) with Erbakan as its
leader scored the first big victory at the municipal elections in central, eastern and
southeastern regions as well as in major cities – Ankara and Istanbul. Next year this party
left behind its opponents and collected 21.38 percent of the votes which gave it 158 seats
in the parliament and formed a coalition government with Doğru Yol Partisi (the True
Path Party).49 The strong positions of the fundamentalists in the parliament and the
cabinet could not fail to affect the Chechen issue. By stressing the well-established theme
of Islamic brotherhood fundamentalists inevitably stirred the warm feelings in the
Turkish community towards the fraternal Muslim people of the North Caucasus in
general, and according to Gudiashvili some Islamist cabinet members in particular, were
actively campaigning for Turkey’s more efficient support of Chechnya.50
4.2 Islamic radicalism in Turkey
Apart from the Islamic fundamentalists there was even more radical groups in
Turkey that were ready to use every means to protect the Islamic interests not only in
Turkey but everywhere in the world. There was the group of Salafi Islam devotees, more
generally known as Wahhabis. Their religious conviction – Wahhabism being at the same
time the official religion of Saudi Arabia, was notorious for its intolerance towards other
convictions and indeed anything that did not coincide with the rules specified in the
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Koran and those (including Muslims) who did not agree with Wahhabis’ views would be
considered as the enemies of Islam and jihad had to be launched against them. Wahhabis
welcomed the use of sucide bombing and other terrorist actions directed against the
“infidels” because ends justified means, so everything was allowed in the name of jihad.
According to Prof. Doğu Ergil, who has been studying world terrorism and has written
two books on it, contrary to some beliefs a regular network of those “jihadists” has been
set up in Turkey and their religious approach, interpreting Islam in the most fanatical way
has been dominating unofficial religious instruction in Turkey for the past twenty years.51
Following the military coup in 1980 the Turkish government under the leadership of
General Kenan Evren turned a blind eye to the development of Islamic radicalism in
Turkey, says Ergil.52 While trying to preserve the young generation from any radical
movement, i.e. communism the Turkish government proposed two things: religion and
sports. However, trying to contain one radical movement Turkish authorities
inadvertently promoted another, even more dangerous. Under the cover of harmless
religious missionaries many Salafi devotees could freely enter Turkey and open their
facilities where people were taught radical Islamic. Enjoying considerable financial
support from collaborators in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria Salafi teachers
could relatively easily lure not only ordinary people but also clerics into their circle. In
1993 Ugur Mumcu an investigative journalist had written that many Turkish imams were
paid by Saudi Arabia’s radical religious organization.53 However, the head of state Evren
confronted all the best-known journalists and defended the situation of the imams who
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promulgated the Salafi doctrine among Turkish citizens and received salaries from
abroad. Ergil called such mild treatment of Islamic radicals by the Turkish authorities
“idiocy” because according to him after the card-blanche given to the Salafis many Turks
soon fell under their influence and became “jihadists prepared to sucrifice themselves
with no limits to what they might do.”54
Defining their goals as cleansing the Muslim territories from foreign “infidels”
and secular governments Salafis took it as their duty to participate in every conflict where
Muslims were involved. The first significant participation of Salafis in the warfare was
their venture in Afghanistan where they fought against the Soviets. After the withdrawal
of the Soviet troops Afghanistan soon became the Salafis’ major place for ideological and
combat training. After Afghanistan there came Bosnia and Chechnya. Ergil claimed that
many Turks influenced by the Salafi teaching went to fight on the separatists’ side in
Chechnya.55 Apart from those who took a direct part in clashes with the Federal forces
there were those in Turkey who tried to provide all necessary support for their
collaborators. Such support included arranging meetings and demonstrations directed
towards public opinion on the matter and getting the necessary reaction. Very much
attention was paid by radicals to information networks and they worked hard in that
direction through newspapers, journals, TV and radio programs.
The role of the media in manipulating the public attitude will be discussed in
further chapters, but it is useful to provide a small but vivid example of how the
propaganda of the radical Islamic groups with the support of the mass media could
produce quite impressive effects. During the conflict in former Yugoslavia the American
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embassy in Ankara was attacked by a large group of Turks who were infuriated by the
news that Serbians were reportedly using chemical weapons in Bosnia.56 In Moslem
Turkey many people affected by the newspapers describing the Serbian atrocities towards
“people of Islam” felt a strong kinship with the Bosnian Muslims’ struggle for
independence. If the Americans were attacked only for doing nothing to protect the
Bosnian Muslims it could be easily imagined what response from Islam-oriented circles
in Turkey Russia would get after its decision to resolve the Chechen crisis by military
means.
 On the part of Dudayev and his supporters a great effort was made to present
events in Chechnya as the ultimate struggle of Chechen Moslems for freedom. Hoping to
draw attention on the part of the Islamic world and to receive aid from pro-Islamic
organizations, for Dudayev it was beneficial to represent himself as the valorous warrior
of Allah, leading his deeply religious soldiers into the struggle with infidels. In reality,
however, Islam, or at least its traditional Sunni faction never occupied leading positions
in a life of Chechens. The development of Islam in Chechnya deserves separate attention.
4.3 Islam in Chechnya
4.3.1 Historical roots of Islam and its role in the conflicts in the Northern Caucasus
Many writers often overemphasize the role of Islam in Chechen society and
especially its role in resisting invaders. For instance, Muhammad Iqbal Khan claimed that
Islam was the only ideology that united the mountaineers in their struggle against the
tsarist Russia.57 Or another author Lesley Blanch, who in emphasizing the importance of
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Islam among the Chechens in the Caucasian War wrote: “…a fanatic religious movement
– which was to grow until every village was a fortress, every man a fighting monk, and
the whole country led, in battle, as in prayer, by an Imam who preached resistance with
fire and sword.”58 Taking into consideration that both of the works are rather literary than
academic and that the authors may have romanticized the mountaineers’ love for freedom
and ferocity in battle, we may assume that they found strong devotion to Islam the most
plausible explanation for those features of the indigenous people of the Caucasus.
However, some serious scholars also shared the idea that Islam in the North Caucasus
was a fundamental motive for resistance. Among them there were historians sympathetic
to the mountaineers’ confrontation with the Russian Empire, such as Alexandre
Bennigsen, Marie Broxup, and Anna Zelkina, as well as pro-Russian historians, such as
M.M. Bliev and V. V. Degoev.59
Yet anyone interested in the relationship between Islam and conflict in the North
Caucasus should look back to the origins of Islam in the region, and becomes clear that
the introduction of Islam to the North Caucasus was neither peaceful nor quick. Those
who claimed that Islam was widespread in Chechnya from the very start and denied that
it was adopted from the outside were usually the radical Chechen nationalists whose
extreme emotional pressure in conditions of continuous political and economical crisis
had generated in their consciousness fantastic images concerning the origins of the
Chechen people. Thus M. Nakhshoyev in the newspaper “Ichkeria” wrote: “From ancient
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times every real nokhcho (Chechen) has been Muslim because we are the descendants of
Nokh (Noah)…Our traditions and customs are fully consistent with the Koran.”60
Reality, however, was very different from such romanticism. Islam was first
introduced to the North Caucasus in the 7th century by Arab invaders. In 642-643, just ten
years after the death of Muhammad, Muslim Arabs under the command of Suraqa bin
Amr reached the city of Derbent in Southern Dagestan. Reflecting Derbent’s strategic
location between the eastern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains and the Caspian Sea, the
Arabs dubbed the city Bab al-Abwab, or “the Gate of the Gates.” But to conquer that gate
was a task of extreme difficulty for the Arabs because the local tribesmen did not meet
the adherents of Muhammad with embraces and did not hurry to adopt Islam. On the
contrary, they fought with ferocity, dealt the invading Muslims several sharp defeats and
in 652 even slew the Arabs’ commander on the battlefield.61 Even after the people of
Derbent were converted to Islam and the city became a northern outpost of Muslims the
resistance of other North Caucasian tribes continued and local population that was
converted to the Islamic faith found itself just as beleaguered by the mountain tribes as
the original Arab Muslims.62 The Arabs and their chronicles repeatedly expressed
exasperation with the warlike North Caucasian infidels. The commander of the Arab
army Suraqa bin Amr described the torment of fighting the mountaineers in poetry, while
al-Masudi’s irritated depiction of local Dagestani chieftains as a “host of robbers,
brigands, and malefactors” similarly underlines the Muslims’ frustration.63 Similar
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expressions would be used by the Russian military commanders in the Caucasus eleven
centuries later.
Actually, the main feature of the North Caucasus inhabitants was to resist any
power that might attempt to subdue them. Together with their fierce nature and rugged
landscape this made the North Caucasus a place where no authority could be imposed by
force. The Ottoman historian Ahmed Cevdet Paşa noted the relationship between the
geography of the North Caucasus and the mountaineers’ love of freedom, “Since their
land is steep and difficult, they do not submit to a government.”64
For the mountaineers all invaders were alike: the Roman Empire or Arabs,
Genghis Khan or Tamerlane, the Safavid, Ottoman or Russian Empires. All those
historical great powers tried to subjugate the Caucasus at different times and the
mountaineers always fought them with an equal fury. And in all this stubborn resistance
Islam played little role for the North Caucasians. During the struggle with Mongols and
Tamerlane Islam was not widespread as yet and knowledge of formalized religion was
limited among the mountaineers. Safavids and Ottomans were Muslims themselves so the
role of Islam in the mountaineers’ resistance could not be significant at all. And even by
the time when the Russian conquest of the Caucasus had begun and Islam was already
widespread among the Vainakh tribes it played little role because, in Michael Reynolds’
accurate words, “…as we have seen from the earlier episodes, the mountaineers had no
need for Islam as an incentive to fight outside forces.”65 Those who tend to stress the
religious side of the conflict between the North Caucasians and the Russian Empire
usually do so because of the charismatic figures of Sheikh Mansur and imam Shamil who
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both proclaimed ghazavat and led the Caucasian tribes in battle under the green banner of
Islam.66 However, in both cases Islamic identity alone was not sufficient to unite the
mountaineers.
The rebellion of Mansur was the first time that the Russians came face to face
with the self-proclaimed Sheikh and Chechens, who supported “the holy war against the
infidels.” However, the role of Islam in that conflict can be questioned because Mansur’s
authority over other Muslims in Chechnya was not strong. He managed to influence
people in Chechnya by his initial military successes, which he attributed to divine
assistance from Allah. But as the struggle went on Mansur’s later defeats deprived him of
his claims to work miracles and considerably undermined people’s belief in him. Some
qadis and mullahs of Tabarsaran denounced him as a “humble shepherd” and “an
impostor” who had no right to instruct them or others.67 And one Muslim cleric even
wrote to the Russian authorities and volunteered to assassinate Mansur in return for a
2000 ruble reward and having his name kept secret.68 Moreover, despite the tragic nature
of the warfare between Russia and the mountaineers, that historical episode cannot be
regarded as a pure confrontation between Christianity and Islam. The fact that Mansur
had declared ghazavat against the pagan and semi-pagan Ingush as well shows that too
much in that conflict depended on the personality of Mansour, his religious fanaticism,
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rather than on the truly fundamental contradictions between the Orthodox Russians and
Muslim Chechens.69
Neither was religion the primary factor in the mountaineers’ resistance led by
Shamil that lasted for quarter of a century. Rather than a motivation for the resistance
Islam was more, as Reynolds says, “a guide for how the resisters should organize their
communal lives.”70 Indeed, Shamil’s effort to Islamize the mountaineer societies of the
Caucasus and transform them according to sharia rules was so impressive that among the
mountaineers Shamil’s era was referred to not as “the time of the Great War against the
Russians” or as “the time of Shamil” but rather as “the time of the sharia.”71 Shamil used
Islam as a tool to build a centralized state and establish more or less effective
bureaucracy. In accomplishing that task he made an endeavor to change the social
attitude of the mountaineers and to replace their customary rules and norms called adat
with sharia and almost succeeded. We say almost, because some of the mountaineers’
customs such as blood feuds were too deep-rooted in their living styles to be easily
replaced. Still, Shamil’s success in reformation of the North Caucasians’ societies and
establishing rules of sharia in that region was evident.
Less impressive was the significance of Islam in Shamil’s warfare against the
Russian armies. First of all, mountaineers, as was mentioned above were themselves
“congenital warriors” and their tendency to oppose any authority from outside was
strong. Even Shamil with his great authority and the rules of sharia complained that the
mountaineers and especially the Chechens were extremely disobedient. When, for
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example, Shamil replaced his Chechen deputy commander or naib, Tasho Hajji, the
Chechens killed the replacement and compelled Shamil to reinstate Tasho Hajji.72
Second, neither was the support for Shamil’s ghazavat absolute. Another Shamil
naib Hadji-Murat Gadjiyev, who was also a pious Muslim, fled from Shamil, submitted
himself to the Russians and offered to use his popularity among the mountaineers for
bringing them on to the Russian side.73 Several other North Caucasian religious leaders
also supported the Russians and even Ghazi Muhammed and Shamil’s own spiritual
tutor, Jemal al-Din al-Ghumukhi, opposed the war effort.74 Another religious authority
Kunta Hajji, the initiator of the Quadiriya tariqat in the North Caucasus also did much to
undermine Shamil’s war effort. His preaching a quietist form of Islam and advocating
non-resistance to the Russians found a receptive audience among the war-weary
mountaineers and Shamil finally decided to expel him from the North Caucasus, but the
mountaineers’ exhaustion further fostered by Kunta Hajji’s teachings was almost
complete.75
So, rather than being a direct cause of the resistance and introducing the concept
of ghazavat Islam during the Shamil era was mainly as Reynolds says “a source of
conceptual architecture for the creation of a centralized state.”76 But unfortunately
warfare leaves a deeper imprint on the course of history than any other less bloody event.
For instance, almost everybody in the world knows that Germany was the initiator of the
two greatest world wars but few would know about the “German economical miracle” in
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the post-war years. In the same way Islam in the North Caucasus is frequently identified
with Mansur’s and Shamil’s rebellions against the tsarist regime and the inhabitants of
the region, especially the Chechens, are portrayed as devout Muslims who fully
supported those rebellions.
Not long after the capture of Shamil in 1859 the Caucasian volcano became
dormant after 1864 when the Caucasus became part of the Russian Empire and Chechens
among other mountaineers became Russian subjects. Still small eruptions would take
place afterwards. Especially in times when the central power was weakened in the
country radical elements would try to use the opportunity, dragging the exhausted
Caucasian people in general and Chechens in particular into another conflict with the
center. Such conflicts happened during the 1917 revolution and the subsequent Civil War,
the first post-revolutionary years, which were extremely difficult for the country, and the
Second World War. Again the role of Islam as a moving force in those conflicts is highly
questionable despite the claims that they were the results of the actions of the Sufi
Brotherhoods in Chechnya.77 In fact, the resistance movement was neither widespread
nor united and consisted of several groups pursuing different goals that were quite far
from religious motives. According to Red Army intelligence officers’ investigation the
groups varied between those “committed to reviving the Mountaineer Republic, those
seeking an Islamic state, those engaged in ordinary banditry, and those groups acting out
of a mix of ideological and pragmatic motives.”78
4.3.2 Islam and Dudayev’s policy
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During the Soviet regime in Chechnya as everywhere in the Caucasus and all over
the USSR religion was suppressed and any kind of religious social movement peaceful or
violent was unthinkable. The situation changed drastically after the end of the USSR
when the idea of communism had completely collapsed and the new ideology, capable of
disciplining people and giving them an integral world outlook was required. With
Dudayev’s access to power in Chechnya that ideology became Islam, but a different one.
It was a sort of mixture of the traditional Sunni thoughts with more radical branches and
Chechen national customs and traditions. In Sanobar Shermatova’s words it was “a
symbiosis that plunges scholars on Islam into amazement.”79
Actually, the idea of the revival of Islam in Chechnya was rather a tool in
Dudayev’s hands than his real ultimate goal. Being a former Soviet military officer, who
was educated in a proper Soviet manner, was like his other military comrades a
Communist Party member and thus “politically grounded and morally stable,” Dudayev
had a very little idea of what Islam and its rules really were. His “devotion to Islam”
became well known when during one of his interviews he failed to know how many times
a day should a Muslim pray.80 Or his posing in front of the journalists and sending a
whiff of vodka in their direction while talking about how deliberate he was in defending
“his country” did not strengthen his image of a so-called noble warrior for Islam.
Moreover, the whole political atmosphere in Chechnya in the early 90-s was far from
being saturated with religion. The inhabitants of the Chechen village Roshni-Chu told the
correspondent that before the conflict the Chechens did not even know how to do namaz
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properly.81 And even during the conflict one of the founders of the Vaynakh Democratic
Party the nationalist Lema Usmanov would claim that the basic green field of the new
Chechen flag was intended to symbolize the fertility of the native land but not Islam,
while the Chechen combat hymn  “freedom or death!” would prove to be a translation of
Cuban “Patria o Muerte!” with the addition “Allah Akbar”, and even Shamil Basayev,
who would later become one of the leaders of the Chechen radical Muslims more
commonly known as Wahhabis would construct his image more from Che Guevara, than
from his historical namesake.82
During the negotiation process with the federal center when his relations with
Moscow worsened Dudayev in the form of threat declared that he would define a route
for the construction of an Islamic republic in Chechnya.83 His using Islam for his political
goal rather than for its own sake was clearly demonstrated by his speaking to the ‘council
of elders’ in November 1994, when Dudayev said that “one way to fight against Russian
aggression” would be to introduce the Sharia, but “if the Russians will stop the
aggression, we will take away this Islamic constitution.”84 First of all, by doing so he
planned to get some concessions from the Federal Center that surely would not welcome
the creation of “Islamic state” on its soil and would try to avoid such possibility.
Secondly, an Islam-oriented policy (together with the hard nationalist stance) was
the easiest way to gain popularity and support from the Chechen community, which after
the several decades of the religion-banning Soviet approach welcomed the reverse of the
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political trend in their republic and a new leader promising more religious freedom and
even stressing the importance of Islam - the religion to which almost all the Chechens
belonged although not observing it rigorously. Thus, Dudayev in Chechnya indeed
showed himself as a leader strictly demarcated from his Soviet nomenklatura
predecessors and associated himself with Sheikh Mansur and Imam Shamil – the figures
that did much to promote Islamic values in the Chechen society. Moreover, the religious
ideas helped to distract the people’s attention from the miserable economic situation they
found themselves in starting from early 1990-s. While pensions and salaries were not
paid for months the Chechen leaders (who were definitely themselves free from financial
problems) would justify it in terms of the Almighty’s distributing wealth to people, about
which nothing could be done. The role of Islam in Chechen society in the 90-s can be
perfectly shown by its national aphorism – “Islam to those below – oil to those above.”85
Thirdly, by making public statements as to the establishment of sharia in
Chechnya and the so-called threat posed by Moscow to the Chechen Muslims Dudayev
wanted to attract the attention of the Islamic World and hoped to get financial assistance
from the transnational network of its missionary organizations including the radical ones.
And that hope was not in vain because starting from the early nineties there were
financial donations from the Arab countries to Chechnya in support of Dudayev’s
separatist policy. Those donations were in Lieven’s words “small in international terms,
but great by local ones” and “made a strong impact” in the social lives of the Chechens.86
Possessing quite humble financial opportunities ordinary Chechens would get easily
enticed by the lucrative offers of Islamic disciples from outside and become members of
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their groupings that due to Dudayev’s encouragement were spreading in the republic like
mushrooms after the rain. Smith emphasizes that “[f]undamentalist teachers from Saudi
Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East gravitated to the region, entering universities
and other parts of public life” in Chechnya.87 Apart from the financial opportunities those
teachers could use the spiritual vacuum created during the Soviet period, so they received
as Reynolds says “relatively little intellectual resistance” and “enjoyed a special
advantage in this environment.”88
4.3.3 Influx of Vahhabism in Chechnya
The spread of Wahhabis or as they were also called Salafi Islam devotees in
Chechnya was similar to the Turkish case when religious extremists under the image of
harmless educational figures started the process of transforming ordinary people into
religious fanatics and potential terrorists. Owing to the fact that the Chechens were very
keen on preserving their customs that quite often contradicted the rules of the Koran the
influence of Wahhabis was not very strong at the beginning. However, due to their active
participation in warfare on the side of Dudayev against the Federal Forces situation
changed drastically. During the conflict military formations consisting of Wahhabis were
far better armed and equipped than the other separatist units owing to the financial
assistance from abroad. In 1995 in Chechnya there appeared a Jordanian named Fathi
ash-Shashani who was one of the main ideologists of the fundamentalist radicals in
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Chechnya and developed a dynamic activity in the republic.89 According to the Muslim
authorities in the Chechen republic Fathi was the emissary of Bin Laden – the well
known leader of the terrorist organization Al-Oaeda - and had bank bills signed by the
latter.90 Another significant figure of the Islamic fundamentalists in Chechnya was
Khattab – the volunteer from Saudi Arabia, who in his own words came to help his
Muslim brothers in Chechnya “to fight in the name of Allah.”91 Having already combat
experience in Afghanistan and Tajikistan where he fought on the side of Islamic
opposition Khattab’s military action in Chechnya was quite effective. He formed two
commando brigades consisting mainly of Egyptian and Saudi Arabians and was
responsible for several devastating surprise attacks against the Federal Forces. One more
mercenary commander from Saudi Arabia deserving notice was Abu al-Waleed, who first
came to Chechnya as a religious tutor in 1995 but then took up arms and joined the
separatists’ resistance. He also was known for raising funds for Dudayev’s forces.
So, due to the Wahhabis’ degree of success on the battlefield and the charisma of
their leaders like Khattab and al-Waleed Wahhabis in Vakhit Akaev’s words they “got an
aura of defenders of the native land, warriors of Islam and owing to that their positions in
Chechnya became considerably stronger.”92 Following the end of the military conflict
Wahhabis indeed greatly increased their influence. Many supporters of this radical
movement like M. Udugov, I. Khalimov, A.-V. Khusainov joined the government formed
by the new Chechen leader Maskhadov, and everywhere in Chechnya there started
                                                
89  Alexei Kudriavtsev, “Vahabbism: problemy religioznogo ekstremizma na Severnom Kavkaze,” Central
Asia and the Caucasus, (No. 3, 2000)
90 S. Shermatova, "Таk nazyvayemye…, p. 407
91 Ibid, p. 408
92 Vakhit Akaev, “Religiozno – politicheskiy konflikt v Chechenskoy Respublike Ichkeria,” Central Asia
and the Caucasus, (No. 5, 1999)
46
operating the sharia courts that replaced the civil ones and new regulations changing the
habitual style of the social life of the Chechens were being forced on by Wahhabis.93
This growing power of the Wahhabis, however, brought neither welfare nor safety
to the Chechens. Maskhadov’s intention to use the Wahhabi ideology as an antidote to
clan diversity and criminality in Chechnya failed for two main reasons. First of all,
Chechens were very reluctant to give up their traditions, beliefs and blood relations in
exchange for the principles of the radical Islamists and sometimes even opposed them
with arms. Thus, in 1995 when Wahhabis tried to remove the commemorative plaque of
Hedi - Kunta Hajji’s mother - Chechens rose to defend their relic with guns in their
hands.94 Three years later in Gudermes there was a huge armed clash between Wahhabis
and devotees of the Sufi tariqats led by brigadier general S. Yamadaev with hundreds of
supporters from both sides and according to the official data 50 men were killed in that
skirmish. After that tragic event people’s attitude towards “the bearded ones,” as
Wahhabis are known in the Caucasus greatly worsened and even Maskhadov himself
publicly ordered the local authorities to expel Wahhabis from Chechen territory.95
The second reason was that rather than serving as a tool for struggle with the
criminality in the republic as had been planned by some Chechen leaders, Wahhabis on
the contrary encouraged criminal activity and used gangster methods themselves. In 1998
they killed the mufti of Dagestan S.M. Abubakarov, who openly criticized Wahhabism,
and made similar attempts on the lives of the mufti of Chechnya A.H. Kadyrov, S.
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Yamadaev and Maskhadov himself! Moreover, Wahhabis welcomed to their group some
outright criminals such as Arbi Baraev, who kidnapped and publicly decapitated British
and New Zealand telecom engineers in December 1998. Wahhabis were also responsible
for the eruption of kidnappings that ravaged Chechnya and neighboring Dagestan.
According to various reports someone called Abdurrahman who supposedly came to
Chechnya from the Arabic world granted permission for the kidnapping of foreigners and
those who would not accept the Wahhabi ideology.96
As a result, the Wahhabis’ activities brought much more harm than advantage to
the majority of the Chechens because they were absolutely indifferent to the fate of
Chechnya and its people. They regarded Chechnya as a springboard for a universal
Islamic revolution, just as the “internationalists” who flooded Russia in 1917 regarded it
as fuel for kindling a world communist revolution. However, all over the rest of the
Islamic world they got praise and admiration since they were in Reynolds’ words a
“living proof that a small but pious people could defeat great powers with little more than
courage and faith in God.”97 Islamic activists from many countries evaluated the
participation of Muslim volunteers in the warfare as an example of Islamic solidarity and
each major or minor success of Dudayev’s forces on the battlefield was portrayed as not a
Chechen but a Muslim victory.98
That case was valid for Turkey as well. Cengiz Çandar, one of the most prominent
Turkish newspaper columnists emphasized the Chechen resistance as a moral boosting
event for Muslim communities especially after the “blood bath in Bosnia, injustice in
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Palestine, and losses in Azerbaijan.” He also stressed the role of Islam as a uniting force
for resistance in Chechnya and stated that Chechens were “the most religious people
among the Soviet Muslims.” Finally, according to him, the only condition under which
normal relations between Turkey and Russia could develop was “Russia’s giving up the
intention to oppress Turkic and Muslim people.”99
Çandar’s statements actually reflected the general mood of the Turkish mass-
media, which with some exceptions took a clearly anti-Russian position in illustrating the
events in Chechnya. The scope of the Turkish media’s approach and its influence on
public opinion in Turkey will be discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER V
 THE CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA AND THE TURKISH MASS-MEDIA
5.1 General attitude of the Turkish media towards the conflict
The Turkish mass-media’s reflection on the Chechen issue was able to satisfy the
needs of any kind of anti-Russian public. Those who paid much attention to Islam could
find in some newspapers an emphasis on the justified struggle of Muslims against the
infidels. The word “Chechen” in those newspapers would be frequently substituted with
the word “Muslim,” the warfare in Chechnya would be seen as part of general struggle of
Islamic countries against the oppressive West, and the parallels with the conflicts in Iraq,
Bosnia, Palestine, Algeria where a “massacre of Muslims” took place would be drawn.100
Unfounded reports that the rights of Muslims in Russia had always been infringed like
the rights of blacks in South Africa, and that Muslims there were considered as “third-
class people” would appear.101 There were also unequivocal statements that the conflict
in Chechnya brought the ideas of the possible breakup of the Russian Federation and that
would be a “positive outcome for the Islamic World including Turkey.”102 The deep-
rooted religiousness of the Chechen insurgents would be underlined by portraying them
as mudjaheedins fighting under the Islamic banners “Kelime-i şahadet” and
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“Allahuekber” or publishing interviews with Chechen commanders like Shamil Basayev,
who would express their readiness to fight for Islam everywhere.103 Similarly, Dudayev
would strongly emphasize the role of Islam in their struggle and call the Islamic states to
help Chechnya according to the norms of the so-called Islamic brotherhood. According to
Dudayev, the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE were all “clubs of Christians” so Chechens as
Muslims could not accept any help from them.104 He also drew parallels between the
warfare in Chechnya and Afghanistan where Afghanis like Chechens had fought
desperately only with the help of Allah.105 However, nothing was mentioned about the
fact that it was Dudayev, who took an active part in killing many of his “Muslim
brothers” in Afghanistan during the Soviet military campaign with carpet bombing and
was even decorated for that.
For the Turkic nationalist public which supported the idea of close relations and
even the unification of all Turkic states and autonomous republics, some Turkish
newspapers emphasized the significance of events in Chechnya for Turkey as the
opportunity to express their protests against the “oppression of the Turkic community.”
Although it had no relation to Turkic origin, on the pages of some Turkish newspapers
Chechnya was added to the list of Turkic autonomous republics within the Russian
Federation like Tatarstan, Chuvashia, Bashkortostan and others, and groundless
statements about all those republics’ plans to separate from the Federation were made.106
In order to make events in Chechnya closer to the Turkish public’s awareness the mass-
media started giving Turkish names to some Chechen leaders. Thus Dzhokhar Dudayev
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became Cevher, Movladi Udugov became Mevlüd and Aslan Maskhadov’s surname was
changed to a turkified version – Meshedoğlu.107 Sometimes in pursuit of sensational
information Turkish newspapers would neglect factual accuracy. For instance a strong
headline such as “Turkic Support for Chechens” would be followed by the information
that the leaders of North Caucasian Republics including Dagestan, North Ossetia,
Karachai-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia and Adygey had sent petition to
Moscow to stop the military conflict in Chechnya. Although the only representatives of
the Turkic world from the participants listed were Karachai and Kabardia, by looking at
the heading one could get the impression that there was a sort of Turkic unity in the
Caucasus supporting Dudayev’s Chechnya.108 Or another example of wrong but attractive
public information could be the portraying of the well known Caucasian leader Imam
Shamil as a Turkic commander “leading Muslims and Turks in their struggle against
Russian imperialism.”109 By referring to Shamil more radical authors would claim
cultural and political proximity between Chechnya and Turkey and call for Turkey’s
support for the separatists.110
Those who did not stick to Islamic or Pan-Turkic ideas but nevertheless
sympathized with the Chechens usually did so because of the image that had been created
of a struggle between opponents, one of which was outnumbered but willing to
compensate for the lack of quantity with the toughness and determination of its fighters.
This public nourished its imagination with articles from newspapers describing Chechens
as “21st century commandos” or “Rambos” who “with smiling faces and pockets full of
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ammo charge at the enemy lines.”111 Another newspaper published Dudayev’s statement
that every Chechen had to kill at least 100 Russian soldiers, othervise he would not be
considered a şehit (Muslim who has died in battle).112 The same sense of admiration
could be found in the article “Chechens – Kings of Moscow” describing the Chechen
organized criminal groups and their influence in Moscow. The statement that the mere
hearing of the name of one of the Chechen gang leaders (Nukhayev, Suleymanov,
Islamov, Atlangeriyev) could make any Muscovite tremble demonstrates that the image
of Chechens as “tough guys” was very strong in Turkey.113 (Interestingly enough,
previously, the Turkish press had dismissed all the claims by the Russians as to a
Chechen mafia as “fantasy”).114 Reporting on the warfare the Turkish newspapers would
usually describe only the successful military operations performed by the Chechen side
and present the losses of the Federal forces as huge while the losses of the separatists
were usually presented as ten times less.115
5.2 Emphasis on casualties
The numbers that were not concealed in Turkish newspapers were the losses
among civilians in Chechnya. Starting from January 1995 especially and during the
following four months of warfare Turkish newspapers were full of descriptions of great
destruction and casualties among civilians in Chechnya caused by the Federal Forces’
bombardments. Usually those descriptions would be given strong headlines such as
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“Russians Perform a Massacre,” “Chechnya is Bloodbath,” “Russians Kill Civilians,”
“Russians Set Fire to Chechnya,” “Chechen Civilians Under Fire,” “Brutality in
Chechnya” and so on.116 Certainly, newspapers with such headlines could hardly leave
their readers indifferent to events in Chechnya and inescapably gave rise to anti-Russian
sentiments.
In general, the issue of civilian losses during the military operations in Chechnya
performed a key function in forming the tense atmosphere around the Chechen conflict
not only in Turkey but in other parts of the world as well. And the role of the mass-media
in that was also not of minor importance. How the mass-media could affect not only
public opinion but also governing circles in a given state was clearly demonstrated by the
USA’s reaction towards events in Chechnya. At the beginning of the conflict between the
separatist regime and the Federal Center the US’s State Department press spokesman
Michael McCurry said in a briefing on December 12, 1994: “We have been aware for
some time, for months, of the conflict that exists in Chechnya, the efforts that the
Russians have made to control violence there, to deal with what has been a very crime-
ridden and corruption-ridden province….We are certainly well aware of the situation and
how the Russians have been responding to it. But by no means does Chechnya define the
broad parameters of the U.S. - Russia partnership.”117 However, later as the scale of the
warfare increased and reports about civilian losses became more frequent the US’s
attitude started to change. During his visit to Moscow on the occasion of the 50th
anniversary of Victory against Nazi Germany in May 1995 at a press conference the US
President Bill Clinton said “The civilian casualties and the prolongation of the fighting
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have troubled the rest of the world greatly.”118 Although according to The Times
correspondent Anatol Lieven the number of civilian dead was greatly exaggerated by
journalists, Clinton’s words clearly indicated that the media’s reports about the casualties
in Chechnya did not pass unnoticed.119 Later there would come even more harsh
statements from the West. For instance, the International Helsinki Federation for Human
Rights used such expressions as this: “Thousands of civilians die – not as casualties of
warfare per se, but as victims of needless and ruthless slaughter. The Chechnya conflict is
no ‘internal affair’ of Russia, but a threat to European security.”120
Unfortunately, in the course of large-scale military operations no one can escape
from undesirable losses among civilians as was demonstrated during the conflicts in
Vietnam, Angola, Yugoslavia and other places where massive bombardments took place.
Today the U.S. and European states that were criticizing Russia for the events in
Chechnya do the same things in Iraq. And it is necessary to note that some Turkish
newspapers furiously condemning actions of the Federal Forces in Chechnya treated the
American military operation in Iraq with hostility as well. But in the years 1994-96 the
attention of the Turkish newspapers was concentrated mostly on Chechnya or more
precisely on the sufferings that were brought by the warfare.
5.3 Lack of objectivity
It is pointless to deny the fact that many civilian casualties were the result of the
Federal avial bombardment; however, contrary to some popular opinion it would be
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wrong to claim that the Federal side did nothing to prevent the casualties. For example, in
December 1994 following the refusal of separatists to surrender their arms and given that
Dudayev’s forces had established firing posts in the dwelling quarters of Grozny the
Federal side took a decision to evacuate the civilian population from the city before
storming it. While some groups of civilians successfully left Grozny others could not do
so because of obstructions created for them by the separatists. According to the Human
Rights Organization “Memorial,” which can hardly be called pro-Russian for its annual
reports accusing Federal forces of committing war crimes, there was a deliberate
intention on the part of Dudayev’s militants to prevent civillians from leaving the
beseiged city. For instance, when the bus column that came from neighboring Ingushetia
tried to evacuate the civilians it was blocked by the separatists. All the people were
forced to get off the buses and return to their dwelling places, and all the vehicles were
confiscated. Dudayev’s assistant Mavlen Salamov talking to members of “Memorial”
failed to provide any reasonable explanations for the blockage. From his words, however,
it became clear that the order to block the column had come if not directly from Dudayev,
at least from his closest associates.121  Interestingly enough the Turkish newspaper
Zaman would publish the very same Dudayev’s words about his feeling “a deep sorrow”
for not being able to protect approximately 30.000 civilians killed during the “devil
empire’s” bombardments.122 There were other similar cases of Dudayev’s military units’
impeding the attempts to evacuate the civilians from the zones of military activity and
according to the reports of “Memorial” separatist forces often deliberately set their firing
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positions in dwelling houses, schools, hospitals and other similar places causing the
Federal Forces to attack them. In those cases losses among civilians were unavoidable.
The conscious choice of Dudayev’s forces to establish their bases in places surrounded
by civilians is also confirmed by Smith, who wrote that some Chechens were actually
angry with the separatists because the latter attracted bombings of their places. “Many
dreaded,” he wrote, “the day that combatants came into their villages, set up local
command posts, raised rebel flags, and fired machine-guns at airplanes, more in brazen
defiance than with any hope of hitting them. Everyone understood that this brought
retribution.”123  The Chechen people’s attitude towards the actions of Dudayev’s forces
were well described by Yeragi, a 54-year-old Chechen who looking at a few boyeviks
walking from the village Serzhen Yurt into the forest above it said: “It’s those bastards’
fault. We didn’t need this war. So many funerals, so many old people killed or made to
run.”124
Unfortunately, neither of these or other facts demonstrating Dudayev’s so-called
“sorrow” for civilian casualties were present in the Turkish media describing the events
in Chechnya during the first months of warfare. On the contrary, it expressed its
sympathy and ultimate support for Dudayev, whose appeals to the Turkish authorities and
public frequently appeared in the Turkish newspapers and TV channels. In those appeals
Dudayev urged the Turkish government to interfere in events, recognize de-jure the
independence of Chechnya and provide all necessary support for his militants. Sometimes
he simply incited people in Turkey with acts of sabotage directed against Russia such as
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closing the Straits to Russian ships, blocking Russian planes in the airports, etc.125 And
the Turkish public influenced by Dudayev’s appeals would sometimes react accordingly.
For instance, in protest at actions by the Federal Forces in Chechnya hundreds of Turkish
women blocked for several hours the traffic on one of the bridges over the Straits.126
Actually, not only in Turkey but also in many other parts of the world (including
Russia itself, or at least its some circles) the approach of the mass-media to the Chechen
issue was clearly anti-Russian. The most plausible explanation for this must be the
skillful manipulation of information by the Chechen side. Or, as many journalists would
prefer to say, the Chechens affected the world public opinion by winning the so-called
“propaganda war.”
5.2 Fighting on the battlefield and war of information
5.2.1 Ichkeria’s Minister of Information
As stated above, informational support during state actions, especially in war-time
is extremely important because it inevitably affects the troops’ morale and shapes the
public attitude at home and abroad. The Chechen side and especially its propaganda
champion Movladi Udugov, who was appointed by Dudayev as Minister of Information,
understood the power of the mass-media better than the Federals did at that time and a
massive flow of information that was usually far from true started coming from the
Chechen sources. It was very similar to the “Reality control” in Orwell’s Nineteen
Eighty-Four when the primary task of Udugov was not reflecting on the actual events
taking place in Chechnya but making up the “necessary” ones. Smith, who was
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witnessing the information minister’s activity, wrote that whatever Moscow said about
Chechnya would be countered with Udugov’s own information, as with “500 civilians
killed in one bombing raid, 800 Russian soldiers killed in one attack.”127
Being a Wahhabi, or rejecting modern values in favor of the traditional Muslim
theology, did not prevent Udugov from embracing the tools that modernity provided.
While idealizing the existence of the Prophet Mohammed times he, on the other hand,
effectively used tools of radio and TV communication, video devices and the Internet for
his propaganda purposes. Udugov set up the prezidentsky kanal (presidential channel)
that beamed into homes of residents in Chechnya from a secret transmitter carted over the
mountains. Usually that channel played interviews with field commanders and gave
speeches by Dudayev. And like a true electronic pirate, the prezidentsky kanal would cut
into regular local broadcasting put out by the Federal authorities.128 Describing Udugov’s
mass-media skills Smith called him “the most dangerous man the Russians faced” and
wrote:
“Regularly, he (Udugov) rang up foreign or Russian news agencies, radios, TV
channels and newspapers to give the separatists’ side of the story. To the outside
world it all sounded perfectly real when Udugov announced that ‘the president
and chief of staff of Chechnya-Ichkeria’ took some decision or another. His
language was always appropriately official and bureaucratic. No one was told that
the meeting had taken place in a wood.”129
6.2 Treatment of journalists
Udugov’s personal capabilities in handling the media were crucial but they were
not the sole advantage that the Chechen side enjoyed during the warfare. Another factor
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that played an important role in the media’s taking the pro-Chechen position was the
handling of journalists reflecting the events in Chechnya on both sides. Generally
speaking the attitude of the Federal Military towards the people with cameras and
writing-pads was firmly negative. The Federal Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Lieven
writes, “had already suffered very badly from Russia’s free media and their accusations
of corruption against him,” so it was quite natural that he treated journalists with
suspicion and hostility.130 The manner of other military commanders was not much
better. “I do not wish to talk to you,” said General Kvashnin often to journalists waiting
for interview.131 Of course, after such an approach on the Federal side there could be no
positive cooperation between those who fought and those who described the fighting.
One journalist from Moscow, who was appointed by the Federal Center to elucidate
events in Chechnya and given a document stating that he was to be assisted in collecting
the material said that after the very first contact with the Federal paratroopers he was
arrested, thrown into a damp basement and twice threatened with execution.132 And that
was a journalist initially expected to work together with the Federal forces! The then head
of the FSK Sergei Stepashin openly admitted the loss of the information war by the
Federal Center and said
How brilliantly the Chechen Minister of Information Mauvladi [sic] Udugov
works, how artfully and easily he releases to the press any distortion, lie, juggling
of the facts… But we push away the journalists; we are not releasing anything
anywhere, we are not giving anything! And I myself for a long while did not want
to express myself.133
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As for the Chechen separatists, the attitude of Udugov & Co. towards journalists
was just the opposite. Journalists from everywhere could travel freely within the
territories controlled by Dudayev’s militants. They could easily stay with frontline
boyeviks (combatants) and interview their leaders. While the Federal side did not rush to
share its information with the press the Chechens were open to do so. Therefore, most of
the information about events on the battlefield and beyond it was derived from Udugov’s
sources and consequently reflected the separatists’ point of view, although the journalists
(be they Russian, Chechen or from any other country) publishing that information tried to
portray themselves as completely independent and objective.
Actually, the so-called independence and objectivity of a journalist during the
warfare can only be discussed when he is not continually get involved in what is going on
but periodically visits the theatre of action and elucidates the events from a distance
without taking any side. But if he goes along the frontlines for a long time, in most cases
he unwillingly starts to associate himself with those who share with him their food, and
shelter, and whose speeches he records. That is why after being pushed and threatened by
the Federals and having close and prolonged contacts with Dudayev’s side the majority
of the journalists’ reports about Chechnya were clearly pro-Chechen. Separatists in those
reports were usually portrayed as glorious fighters for freedom. Anatol Lieven in his
book about Chechnya even compared Chechen boyeviks with Homer’s epic heroes and
Andrei Babitsky, the correspondent of the Radio Liberty later tried to justify their cutting
the throats of captive Federal soldiers by saying that actually Chechens were not that
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cruel but by doing so they simply wanted to make the war more noticeable and attract
public attention.134
Information availability for journalists and readiness for contact were not the sole
advantages of Dudayev’s side. In waging the essential propaganda war the separatists
spared neither time nor funds. In 1995 in the basements of the presidential palace in
Grozny there was found a document showing that the Ministry of Security of the
Chechen Republic received sufficient amounts of money for paying the journalists their
salaries.135 What kind of journalists they were and for what the salaries were paid the
document does not tell but it at least makes one consider once again why some journalists
in their reports were so sympathetic towards the separatists and were eager to contact
them.
Correspondents for the Turkish media were no exception from this rule and they
also had close access to the separatist side from which they got the information about the
conflict. And it was much easier and safer for them to get in touch with Udugov since the
news agency “Chechen Press” established by the latter was located in Istanbul from
where bulletins issued by the separatist side were faxed not only within Turkey but also
around the world.136 Taking that into consideration and adding the above-mentioned
reasons for Turkish public’s sympathy towards separatists the appearance of statements
in the Turkish mass-media that the Russians surpassed Nazis in their massacres would
not seem to be extraordinary.137
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CHAPTER VII
CHECHNYA AS AN AREA OF DISCORD BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY
7.1 Turkey’s unofficial approach towards the conflict
7.1.1 Pro-separatist organizations
Turkey’s approach towards the Chechen issue is best explained with reference to
two levels quite different from each other. These levels are the official – statements of
Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pacts, agreements and other official documents
concerning the conflict in Chechnya; and the unofficial – all other acts, not authorized by
the Turkish cabinet but nevertheless took place.
The unofficial level meant the activity of public organizations supporting the
Chechen separatists and acting on Turkish soil. Most of those organizations were founded
by the descendants of those who had moved from the Caucasus to Turkey during the
years of “muhacirlik” following the Caucasian War (1819-1859). According to Turkish
media accounts, in Turkey there were about 7 million Turkish citizens of Caucasian
origin and there are about 100 public organizations set up by them.138  According to local
sources, among those organizations the most active ones in terms of expressing their
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support for Dudayev’s Chechnya were those that carried out their activities in the major
cities (Ankara, Istanbul) and in places where a more or less considerable Chechen
diaspora was present. Such places were the Konya area (in Turkey’s central part), Sivas
(central - eastern part) and Kahramanmaraş in the south. And essentially, it was those
places in which the pro-separatist organizations organized the collecting of the public
donations that were supposed to be sent to Chechnya.139 The support provided by them
varied from simple expressions of sympathy towards Chechens to sending finance and
military equipment to the Chechen side. The extent of material assistance provided by
those organizations was limited because, after all, Turkey had its own financial problems
to deal with and could not have the luxury to allocate extra funds from its budget to
support Dudayev. Most of the financial assistance came from the ordinary people in
Turkey, who could contribute their endowments via bank accounts numbers published in
many Turkish newspapers.
A type of support not limited by financial capacity was that expressed in public
actions of protest against the Federal policies regarding Chechnya and harsh statements
by the pro-separatist organizations’ leaders. On December 12, 1994 at a press conference
dedicated to the north Caucasus the President of the North Caucasian Cultural
Association Hikmet Kandemir declared “Russia is out to strangle Chechnya’s urge for
independence…Yet the war is not over and Chechnya is still fighting…Not only the
Chechens in Turkey and outside it but all ethnic Caucasians are supporting the Chechens’
right cause and Chechnya’s struggle for independence,”140 He also pointed out that
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Turkey should be more actively involved in that issue and that its interest was
everywhere in the post-Soviet territory from Crimea to the North Caucasus.141
A little later there was a meeting in support of Chechen independence at Şişli
Abide-i Hürriyet Meydanı. Banners such as “Yeltsin, get your bloody hands off
Chechnya,” “Russia is the leader of tyrants,” “Chechnya is not the backyard of Russia”
were waved and some significant Turkish figures made speeches in support of the
separatists. The president of İhlas Holding Nevzat Yalçıntaş (also the leader of Aydinlar
Ocağı – the so called “intellectuals’ organization”) in his talk presented Chechnya as a
fully independent state and strangely enough as an indicator of its independence he
showed its common borders with Georgia. When the vice-president of the True Path
Party İbrahim Yaşar Dedelek was going to make speech and was hissed by the public, he
said that he participated in the meeting not in the name of the Turkish Prime Minister and
the party’s leader Tansu Çiller but as a “nationalist individual.”142
Dedelek’s statement openly pointed to the fact that the attitude of the Turkish
government towards Chechnya was not as sympathetic as some pro-separatist circles in
Turkey might have expected. Initially, the Turkish government did not show any signs of
disturbance at events in Chechnya and did not try to concentrate any attention on it.
During her visit to Moscow in September 93 (by that time Dudayev had already
unilaterally declared the independence of the Chechen Republic and the possibility of
military conflict between him and the Federal Center was quite high) Tansu Çiller said
“Turkey is looking on the Caucasus from the Russian window” meaning that Turkey was
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not going to interfere in the Russian sphere of influence.143 Actually, Turkey’s approach
was much the same as that of the majority of Western states whose leaders’ statements in
support of Yeltsin’s policy appeared in the Turkish press. The US Secretary of State
Warren Christopher expressed his confidence to the effect that if Yeltsin sent troops in
Chechnya he had no other alternative left and the US would treat his act with
understanding.144 A similar statement was made by the German Minister of Foreign
Affairs Klaus Kinkel, who said that the Chechen issue was an internal affair of the
Russian Federation and recalled that the self-proclaimed sovereignty of Chechnya was
not recognized by Germany.145
Certainly, pro-separatist organizations in Turkey were not satisfied with the
existing circumstances. President of the Chechen Association Hilmi Ünal criticized the
statements of the Turkish Foreign Ministry which according to him was too mild and
feeble regarding the matter and said
“At no time was Chechnya a Russian land. It was only for a limited historical
period that the Chechen people remained subjugated and that the Chechen lands
belonged to Russians. Chechnya belongs to Russia to the same extent as Vietnam
to the United States or India to Britain.”146
Heads of other Caucasian organizations also expressed their support for Dudayev
and announced that many of their young members (not necessarily Chechens) were ready
to fight the Federals in Chechnya.
According to Gudiashvili, the majority of the organizations formed by people of
Caucasian ethnicity shared the nationalist ideas of the radical “Ülkücü” or “Bozkurtlar”
                                                
143 Vakit, 13 December, 1994
144 Akşam, 15 December, 1994
145 Cumhuriyet, 20 December, 1994
146 Gudiashvili, “Turkey and …
66
movement and supported its plans for the greater Turan state.147 One should avoid such
generalizations because the numerous Caucasian foundations are actually diverse in their
political orientation. In Ankara, for instance, there are organizations supporting Pan-
Turkic nationalist ideas as well as organizations cooperating with left-wing circles in
Turkey. There are also Caucasian foundations that (at least officially) do not interfere in
the politics and limit themselves simply to social and cultural activities. Nevertheless, it
is true that some Turkish radical nationalists provided noteworthy support for the
separatists. The fact that Chechens did not belong among the peoples of Turkic origin did
not embarrass some ülkücü’s because the word “Turkic” was successfully replaced by the
word “Muslim” and enmity towards Russia was emphasized as a common point between
Turks and Chechens. Obviously, such a mood served Dudayev well, because he wanted
to use every opportunity to get support not only in Turkey but also outside its borders.
His so-called Special Representative Safita Murat attended the meeting “Chechnya – we
are with you” held in Northern Cyprus and organized by “Ülkü Ocakları” and the
Cultural Center of the Cypriot-Turkish Union in support of Chechen resistance. Later the
president of Northern Cyprus Rauf Denktaş by referring to the Chechen case talked about
the attacks against the Islamic World and used such statements as: “Our hearts are with
our Chechen brothers.”148
As the warfare in Chechnya became more intensive Turkish nationalist
movements started taking more decisive steps. The Nizam – i Alem (New Order) Ülkücü
movement portrayed the events in Chechnya as a direct threat to Turkey saying “what
today happens in Bosnia and Chechnya tomorrow may happen in Istanbul, Izmir and
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Ardahan against the Turkish nation” and urged the Turkish public not to remain silent.149
Afterward, this movement announced its decision to send volunteers to fight in
Chechnya. Those who had agreed to join the volunteer troops were introduced to
journalists and expressed their readiness to die. The chief of the Nizam – i Alem Ülkücü
organization Nasan Basri Arıcı condemned the Federal side for carrying out massacres in
Chechnya and criticized the Turkish government for remaining a mere observer of
events. He also claimed that the number of volunteers had already reached 2.645 and that
in the shortest period they would do all necessary work to send them.150 Other sources
confirm that information saying that there were about 2 thousand Turkish volunteers
fighting on Dudayev’s side and that there were military camps in Turkey (mostly in
Trabzon and Girne) where the volunteers received combat training and from where they
were sent to Chechnya.151 In response to requests by Russian official spokesmen that all
necessary measures to prevent Turkish volunteers from joining separatist forces in
Chechnya be taken, Turkish government responded that the training and sending
volunteers was completely the initiative of the Chechen diaspora, which was acting on its
own.152
7.1.2 Separatists’ connections in Turkey
The Chechen diaspora and its organizations in Turkey were also very energetic in
trying to establish contacts between Dudayev’s government and Turkish official circles.
While Dudayev visited Turkey quite secretly, his aides’ visits were more open and
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received more publicity. For instance, the so-called Foreign Minister of Chechnya
Şemsettin Yusuf visited Ankara in January 95 where he reportedly met with True Path
Party authorities. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey did not confirm the
information an organization called Kafkas Halklari ile Dayanisma Dernegi with which
Yusuf cooperated refused to give details as to the latter’s contacts in Turkey.153 In his
speech Yusuf called for Turkey’s support for the Chechen separatists in their struggle and
said that the real target of the Russian military was Turkey but they (the Chechens) would
never let that happen.154 One more visit was paid to Turkey by the so-called Minister of
Transportation Said Ibragimov, who after being refused a visa to Iran by the local
authorities came to Istanbul where he met with representatives of the Chechen diaspora
and expressed his wish for Turkey to take decisive actions to stop the Russian cruelty.155
Appointed by Dudayev the so-called Minister of Finance of Chechnya Necmettin
Uvaysayev during his brief visit to Ankara agreed with some local groups that bank
accounts would be opened for the support of the separatists and promised to continue
fighting until the last man.156 Another noteworthy Chechen and former speaker of the
Russian Parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov came to Ankara to attend a conference
“Caucasus and Central Asia: Past and Future after the Independence” held at Bilkent
University. His visit was organized without the participation of the Chechen leaders or
pro-Chechen organizations but his attitude towards the Chechen issue was not very
different from the latter. In his talks to the Turkish journalists Khasbulatov expressed his
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gratitude to the Turkish nation for its “sensitivity” in the Chechen matter and supported
the independence of Chechnya.157
By arranging such meetings with the separatist leaders pro-separatist
organizations spent much effort in trying to have the Turkish cabinet extend diplomatic
support to Chechnya and accept it as a subject of International Law. Several requests
were made both by the organizations’ leaders and separatists themselves to the Turkish
government to interfere in events. Various conferences dedicated to the Chechen issue
and directed at attracting the attention of the Turkish cabinet as well as of other
governments in the world were held in Turkish cities. During the preparation for the 4th
Kurultay of the Assembly of Turkic Nations one of the visitors, the owner of the Ugge
Igilik newspaper Bilah Laypanulu stated that Chechnya was only the initial step of Russia
to wipe out all Muslim and Turkic nations from the North Caucasus and in order to
prevent this Turkey should use all diplomatic means.158 Similar statements were made by
Hilmi Ünal, who requested Turkish president Demirel to stop the warfare and assist in
sending humanitarian aid to Chechnya.159 A leader of another pro-separatist organization,
the Caucasus-Chechen Support Committee Fazil Özen, wished for Tansu Çiller and heads
of other states to interfere and stop “that genocide.”160
In addition to the anti-Russian oriented Turkish media mentioned above some
pro-separatist organizations started issuing their own newspapers and journals dedicated
solely to events related to the warfare in Chechnya. Publications with relatively large
circulations in Turkey were the journals Marşo and Çeçenistan published in Ankara and
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Sivas respectively. Later in 1998 the United Caucasian Association in Samsun published
its monthly newspaper Abreklerin Günlüğü which also had a considerable circulation.
Certainly, those journals and newspapers criticized the Federals and published
information favorable to Dudayev’s side.
All in all, Turkey’s unofficial support provided by the pro-Chechen organizations
for the separatists, was not as insignificant as some analysts would claim. The number of
organizations actively involved in collecting material assistance for Dudayev’s side and
lobbying separatists’ interests in Turkey was not small and especially in regions in
Turkey where the North Caucasian diaspora’s influence was strong those organizations
managed to attract public support and even enlist some local authorities for cooperation.
Still they failed to bring Turkey and Russia to the brink of confrontation as intended,
although, as will be further demonstrated, there were some uneasy moments in Russo –
Turkish relations during the Chechen conflict.
7.2 The official side of the Russian-Turkish relations during the Chechen Crisis
7.2.1 Turkey’s initial reaction
As stated above, the Turkish authorities openly stated that the activities of the pro-
Chechen organizations in Turkey were not to be treated as Turkey’s official position
regarding the conflict in the North Caucasus. Indeed, compared to the statements of the
leaders of those organizations the Turkish cabinet used much milder tones in addressing
the Federal authorities. When full-scale warfare began in Chechnya Turkish authorities
including President Demirel, Prime Minister Çiller and officials from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs limited themselves to statements in which they expressed their deep
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regret at seeing the growth of the conflict and called on both sides to use diplomatic
means to stop it.161
Following several invitations from Dudayev to the Turkish authorities to become
an intermediary in the conflict there were some weak attempts on the Turkish side to
participate in settling the issue. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Murat Karayalçın said
that he acted as a mediator between the two leaders – Yeltsin and Dudayev - and
expressed the opinion that creating an alternative government in Chechnya without
Dudayev would not be an effective step towards peace there.162 The Federal side treated
such attempts skeptically since that was interference in Russian internal affairs and the
Turkish side was not pushing the matter too hard. In some cases such invitations from
separatists were simply ignored by the Turkish authorities, and in others they would
express their sorrow for the disaster brought by the conflict but refrain from any harsh
statements. For instance, in response to the request of Hilmi Ünal to help the separatists
Demirel said that he had already done what he could about Chechnya including talks with
Yeltsin and other world leaders. While calling the Chechens “brothers” Demirel
nevertheless stressed Turkey’s desire to preserve good relations with its neighbor
(Russia) and said that Turkey could provide only humanitarian aid to Chechnya.163
Previously, the Turkish government had indeed asked Russia for permission to send
humanitarian aid to Chechnya and after permission had been granted sent 11 tons of
foodstuff, medicine, clothing, blankets and tents for the Chechen refugees.164 Such an act
served well Turkey’s intentions to give some satisfaction to the Caucasian lobby, which
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was demanding from the Turkish authorities the provision of all necessary help to
Chechnya, and at the same time not to spoil relations with Russia. The Russian side was
also anxious about the possibility of ruining the balanced relations between the two
states. The Russian Ambassador in Turkey Vadim Kuznetsov in his interview with the
Turkish press expressed the hope that events in Chechnya would not harm Russo-Turkish
relations and that the Turkish government would approach the issue carefully by
considering the consequences of its further actions.165
7.2.2 Previous matters of disagreement between Russia and Turkey
Worries about events in Chechnya being a possible reason for a deterioration of
relations between the two states were not groundless. Turkey and Russia had already had
some uneasy moments in bilateral affairs and events in Chechnya made previous areas of
discord come again to life.
One of such areas was the European Conventional Forces Agreement (ECFA).
The Turkish side was closely following military events in the Northern Caucasus and
expressed its worries about the deployment of large Russian military units in that region.
At the very beginning of the warfare in Chechnya Turkey sent a message to the Russian
side stating that military activity in Chechnya led to a violation of the ECFA. The Turkish
side did not fail to stress that having significant numbers of Caucasian-origin people on
its territory it closely followed the matter and hoped that the ECFA to which both Russia
and Turkey were parties would be observed.166 Any kind of new agreement, decision, and
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action regarding the presence of the Federal military in the Caucasus was met by Turkey
with caution. Thus, when Georgia signed a new agreement on military cooperation with
Russia and Russian troops were located on the Georgian border with Turkey it was
evaluated as a potential threat by the Turkish media.167 Turkey also invited the US
president Clinton to discuss with Yeltsin the issue of diminishing the number of troops
with respect to the ECFA. Not wishing to upset Yeltsin Clinton did not raise the matter in
discussion. Although Clinton’s position according to Robert Olson did not surprise
Turkey it made its worries even stronger.168
Before that many articles from foreign sources had been published in Turkish
newspapers about the Russian threat emanating from the events in the Caucasus. The
Daily Mail newspaper called Russia the biggest menace to Turkey and warned that the
West’s partner on the NATO bloc (Turkey) could remain isolated against Russia while
Western politicians were trying to please the Kremlin.169 Especially in the light of further
integration of European states and their plans to establish united military forces under the
banner of EU of which Turkey was not a member the Turkish cabinet might indeed fear
such a perspective. That is why Turkey tried to take all possible measures to secure its
borders and make Russia observe the ECFA. It rejected Russia’s proposal to make
amendments in the agreement in return for extra security guarantees from the Federal
side and announced its decision to concentrate extra military units on its Eastern
border.170 That in turn caused some unrest among Russian circles. Not only radicals such
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as Zhirinovsky but also respected political and academic figures in Russia expressed their
worries about a possible Turkish threat. Sergei Karaganov, a respected analyst and a
deputy director of the prominent Institute of Europe of the Academy of Sciences named
Turkey a hostile power, and Alexei Filatov, a deputy chairman of the Duma Defense
Committee and director of the Centre for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts also
referred to Turkey as Russia’s most likely future adversary.171 .
Another disagreement between Russia and Turkey had arisen over the pipelines
for the oil and gas extracted in the states in the Caspian region. After the dissolution of
the USSR Turkey sought for new opportunities regarding the energy resources in those
states and tried to develop several projects that would enable Turkey to get direct access
to the oil and gas of CIS states and participate in its profitable transfer from Central Asia
to Europe. That was not welcomed by Russia, which considered the extraction and
transfers of the energy resources in the Caspian region as its prerogative and did not want
rivals. The clash of interests was inevitable and particularly hot debates started over the
route of Azerbaijani oil. As an alternative to the Baku – Novorossiysk line Turkey
strongly supported construction of a line from Baku through Supsa (Georgia) to Ceyhan
(a town on the Turkish Mediterranean coast). To strengthen its arguments more Turkey
started creating problems for Russian shipping through the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles.
That was in turn another problematic point in Russo-Turkish relations. New
regulations concerning the passage of Russian tankers through the straits and allowing
only one to go through at a time were called among radical circles in Moscow as actions
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“designed to sabotage Russia’s oil exports.”172 The justification on the Turkish side that
changes in the regulations were required because of new safety measures in trying to
prevent accidents and possible spillage that would aggravate pollution did not help much
and Moscow claimed that Turkey was violating the Montreux Convention of 1936
governing the straits.173 An official of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yakov
Ostrovsky said that Turkey with its new regulations was seeking to close the straits to
transport and gave a warning that Russia would present the case to the UN.174
7.2.3 Turkey’s restrained position towards the conflict
Thus, there were evident areas of discord in Russo-Turkish relations and, more
important the Chechen crisis coincided in time with disagreements which might go so far
as to aggravate the situations. Chechen separatists on their part used every opportunity to
provoke a confrontation between Russia and Turkey. Apart from his inflammatory calls
to Turkey to close the straits to Russian ships and undertake further steps to limit
Russia’s economic and political activity, and his blaming Russia for all problems in
Turkey, Dudayev also announced plans to trade North Caucasian oil resources in the
world market and an intention to get access to that market via Turkey.175 The possibility
that such an ambitious plan might be realized might be compared to Dudayev’s previous
promises of a prosperous life in Chechnya. However, his speech sounded agreeable to
those in Turkey who dreamed of participation in the Caucasian oil business. So, to public
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circles that were already supporting Dudayev in Turkey were joined those who might
have expected economic advantages from Chechen independence.
The official side of Turkey, however, was not that enthusiastic about such plans
and did not rush to embrace the Chechens as a new economic partner. The Turkish
government soberly evaluated the situation and despite all disagreements and tensions in
the above mentioned areas did not take an obviously anti-Russian position during the
Chechen crisis. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Ankara responded
in an objective and positive way by supporting Russia’s territorial integrity and the
necessity to preserve it.176 In a statement issued by the Russian MFA it was stated that
Russia was aware of the anti-Russian pressure put on the Turkish cabinet which had
withstood it and took a balanced and objective position.177
Diplomatic relations between two states continued satisfactorily. Prime Minister
Tansu Çiller paid an official visit to Moscow in May 95 on the occasion of the 50th
anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany. Some radical circles in Turkey saw that as
a betrayal to the Chechens.178
Further contacts on various levels were made and to some extent it could be said
that the Chechen conflict played a role as a catalyst for cooperation between Russia and
Turkey. The example is the visit of the FSK chief Stepashin to Ankara in February 95.
During his visit Stepashin met with several Turkish authorities including President
Demirel with whom he discussed the presence of definite groups in Turkey that
reportedly sent weaponry and volunteers to help the separatists. Stepashin called on the
Turkish cabinet to use all their influence to limit the activities of those groups and on his
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side promised that any activities threatening Turkish territorial integrity and thus
damaging Russo-Turkish relations would not be tolerated by Moscow. As a guest of the
director of the National Investigation Committee Sönmez Köksal, Stepashin emphasized
that it was an official visit and that both sides reached agreements in essential areas such
as international terrorism, drug trafficking and economic crimes.179 Stepashin’s visit was
especially significant because there had never been such close contacts between Russian
and Turkish security services before.
There could be several answers to the question as to why Ankara displayed
moderation regarding the Chechen conflict and despite the unrest among its population of
Caucasian origin did not yield to provocation of some radical circles.
7.2.4 Reasons for Turkish cabinet’s initial reluctance to support Dudayev
7.2.4.1 Economic ties with Russia
First of all, as was stressed by Demirel, Turkey did not want to harm its trade
relations with Russia. Following the break up of the Soviet Union Russia soon became
Turkey’s second largest trade partner after Germany and the bilateral trade volume in the
early nineties reached the level of more than three billion $. Despite the disagreements
about the pipeline Turkey was already importing huge amounts of oil and gas from
Russia. Apart from the official economic relations there was also another substantial
trade volume between the two states that was not always recorded by statistics. It was the
so-called “suit-case trade” or “shuttle commerce.” There was a huge flow of low-scale
entrepreneurs buying small amounts of Turkish goods and selling them back in Russia.
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According to the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Alexander Lebedev such trade relations
were especially important because apart from the economic side it included contacts
between people.180 Turkey’s budget got a significant amount of money from the tourism
sector and that was partly because the resorts on Turkey’s southern coast soon replaced
the Crimea as Russians’ favorite place to spend vacation. Turkey’s investment in the
Russian economy was not low either. Starting from early nineties in a short time there
was created a large network of Turkish trade and building companies in Moscow and
other big cities. Bearing in mind all those factors it was clear that Turkey indeed had
much to lose should it extend support for Chechen separatists and undermined its
relations with Russia.
7.2.4.2 Kurdish problem
Second, it was difficult for Turkey to openly support Dudayev and thus act
against the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation because it had similar problems
itself. Kurds in Turkey represented a huge group counting more than 10 million and some
radically-oriented Kurdish circles were trying to create an independent Kurdish state in
the eastern part of Turkey. In 1978 they founded the Kurdistan Workers Party under the
leadership of Abdullah Öcalan and in 1985 the National Liberation Front was set up.181
Each year hundreds of the Front members died in armed clashes with Turkish military
forces. So the Chechen issue was not easy for Turkey in the sense that it was impossible
to insist on the principle of inviolability of the state borders and at the same time support
separatism in another state. That was actually what the Deputy Foreign Minister of the
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Russian Federation Albert Chernyshev said in an interview to the journal “Turkish
Probe” on 25th January 1995 Chernyshev said that although he would avoid direct
comparisons between the Chechen crisis and Turkey’s problems in the southeast, the two
problems did have something in common. He also added that the Russian Federation
entirely supported Turkey’s desire to preserve its territorial integrity but that all
comments … the existence of extremism on one side only were “bad statements.”
Chernyshev then clarified Russia’s concern at the statements and visits of Dudayev’s
aides to Turkey and statements made by certain Turkish parliamentarians in support of
separatists much the same as with Turkey, concerned at Kurdish declarations in
Moscow.182
Turkey was indeed closely following the activities of Kurdish nationalists in other
countries and especially in Russia because the latter had strong historical ties with Kurds.
Kurdish tribes fought on the Russian side during the Russo-Persian and Russo-Ottoman
wars throughout the 19th century and following the heavy defeat of the Ottomans in the
Balkans in 1912 there was especially close cooperation between Russia, which wanted to
annex part of Eastern Anatolia and the Kurds who sought an autonomous state under the
Russian Empire.
Apart from strategic cooperation there were also educational and cultural aspects
connecting the Kurds to Russia. Russia’s interest in the Kurds goes back to as 1787 when
Empress Catherine commissioned the publication of Maurizio Gorzan’s Kurdish
grammar.183 Intensive Kurdish studies were continued and soon St. Petersburg became
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the world center for Kurdology. Nowadays its Institute of Oriental Studies possesses the
largest collection of Kurdish texts. There were also educational units set up in several
Russian cities for Kurdish leaders and their descendants. As Reynolds writes “Kurds saw
Russia as a gateway to European education and enlightenment and sought cooperation
with Russia as a way to break through the backwardness that they believed had trapped
the Kurdish people.”184
Despite all those ties Russia unlike several European states which recognized the
Kurdish parliament in The Hague (Holland) did not make any serious efforts to promote
Kurdish sovereignty. With the exception of statements by some radical leaders in Russia
who saw the Kurdish question as an opportunity to demonstrate their “tough”
nationalism. When two members of Kurdish Office Rustam Broyev and Asiri Serif
applied for permission to open a bureau in Moscow and were rejected, a member of the
Duma for the Liberal Democrat Party led by Zhirinovsky Mikhail Burlakov expressed his
support for Kurdish independence, called Turkey a puppet of NATO and accused it of
atrocities against Kurds.185
Apart from such radically oriented speakers the overall tone of the Federal
authorities concerning the Kurdish question was quite mild and would get stronger only
when information concerning the Turkish cabinet’s support for Chechen separatists
would appear. In that sense the Kurdish problem was perceived by the Russian side as a
way to influence the Turkish authorities if they decided to support the Chechen
separatists. The phrase “those who sit in glass houses should not throw stones” used by
Chernyshev in July 95 when he requested the Turkish government to limit the activities
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of pro-Chechen organizations clearly expressed the Federal position.186 The Turkish side
understood this very well. As Demirel later said in an interview about the Chechen
problem, Turkey could not play any other role than providing humanitarian aid to
Chechnya because if it had approached the Chechen problem beyond those parameters,
the Russian side might have approached the PKK problem differently than it did at that
time.187 So, during the first year of the conflict the official position of Turkey regarding
Chechnya was in general far from being hostile towards Russia.
7.2.5 Growth of tensions concerning Chechnya
Things changed somewhat in the following year. As was already mentioned above
in 1996 the position of the Islamists in the Turkish parliament got stronger and according
to Gudiashvili this “accelerated the process of a revision of an official position on the
North Caucasian issue.”188 As an example of such revision he points out that the Turkish
government repeatedly stated its intention to make Chechnya a full-fledged member of
the Community of the Islamic states. There was also a serious attempt to establish full-
scale official relations between Turkey and Dudayev’s government when with the
participation of the chief of the Welfare Party Erbakan and Dudayev a Turkish citizen
and ethnic Chechen Berkan Yaşar was appointed ambassador of the Republic of Ichkeria
to Turkey. That appointment was supported by Tansu Çiller too.189 Yaşar on his part
called himself an “honorary representative of Turkey in Chechnya.”190 That the new
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Turkish cabinet started demonstrating its sympathy towards the Chechens more openly
was obvious.
The year 1996 had a troublesome start concerning Russo-Turkish relations. On
January 16 a group of terrorists captured the Avrasya ferry going from Trabzon to Sochi,
raised the separatist Chechen banner over it and demanded the cessation of military
actions in Chechnya. Although the trouble was resolved without bloodshed and all the
terrorists were arrested by the Turkish police on the third day of the incident it again
stirred animosity on both sides concerning Chechnya. Yeltsin approved the action of the
Turkish police but accused the Turkish side of trying to bring the Chechen issue to the
world arena.191 Indeed, after the ferry crisis Tansu Çiller expressed herself in these terms:
“A human tragedy is continuing in the Caucasus with mothers and children being
massacred. The attention of the world must be drawn to what is happening there.”192 The
sympathy of some Turkish officials, according to Hakan Aksay was also demonstrated by
“the developments that led to extremely light sentences for the hijackers.”193 Incidentally,
several of them including their leader Mohammed Tokcan soon managed to escape from
the prison.
Besides, early in 1996, two separatist leaders Aslan Maskhadov and Zelimkhan
Yandarbiyev visited Turkey where they met not only North Caucasian public
organizations but also official representatives and thanked both for moral and material
support.194
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Public demonstrations in support of separatists in 1996 were not more frequent
than in 1995, but this time they were usually attended by high-ranking Turkish officials.
The peak of activity was the Turkish public reaction to Dudayev’s death in April 96. On
that occasion the leader of Turkish Liberal Democrat Party Besim Tibuk proposed that an
official mourning should be held in Turkey. In Ankara Kocatepe mosque there was a
huge funeral ceremony that was attended by Welfare Party leader Erbakan, Nationalist
Party leader Alpaslan Turkes, and more than 250 deputies.195
Sanctioned by the local authorities many places in Turkish cities were renamed
after Dudayev. The most vivid examples are the renaming of “Tandoğan Meydanı” into
“Dudayev Meydanı” in Ankara and opening “Şehit Cevher Dudayev Parkı” in Istanbul.
The ceremonial opening of the Park was made by that time Mayor of Istanbul Recep
Tayip Erdogan.196 Now in many cities in Turkey there are various places like streets,
parks, mosques, etc. that carry the name of the former Chechen leader.
Moreover, there were several contacts between separatist representatives and
Turkish officials. In August the so-called Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ichkeria Ruslan
Chimayev visited Ankara to meet with Turkish representative of the Parliamentarian
World Union and the member of Motherland Party Irfan Köksalan.197 At the end of the
month under the leadership of Hozh-Akhmet Nukhayev and Ruslan Chimayev there was
held a meeting in Istanbul dedicated to the discussion of opening Chechen representative
offices abroad. At the same meeting September 6th was declared to be the Chechen
Independence Day.198 Then, in September there was held a program in Istanbul called
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“Hand in Hand with Chechnya” where again calls to Turkish government to support
Dudayev were made. One of the participants - writer Meded Ünlü even stressed Turkey’s
support to the separatists as an important factor in their ability to withstand the Russia’s
superior military power. The program was attended by the mayor of Istanbul Erdogan,
who also expressed his support for the separatists.199
Another significant pro-Chechen activity occured at the beginning of October
with the participation of the deputy Speaker of Turkish Parliament Yasin Hatipoğlu and a
State Minister Sabri Tekir. It was called the International Conference on Caucasus
organized by the Caucasus – Chechen Support Committee. In that conference Ruslan
Chimayev thanked Turkey for the various kinds of help provided to Chechnya including
medical treatment of wounded militants and the freedom given to pro-Chechen action on
Turkish soil. Another Dudayev appointment – the so-called Minister of Health of
Ichkeria Umar Khanbiyev emphasized the role of Turkey as a bridge between Chechnya
and the international arena.200
Despite the change of attitude towards the Chechen issue of the Turkish cabinet in
96 the statements of the Chechen leaders as to about Turkey’s considerable support for
Dudayev should be treated with caution. The medical treatment of Chechen militants
mentioned by Chimayev did indeed take place in Turkish hospitals but it also went on in
hospitals in Egypt, Jordan, Ukraine and ultimately Russia itself. Moreover, to claim that
Turkish Health authorities met them with hugs and kisses would hardly be correct. One
influential Chechen source living in Turkey and having strong links with the local
government in Grozny said that he personally had contacts with bureaucrats in the
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Turkish Health Ministry to arrange the wounded Chechen fighters’ staying in state-run
hospitals, but that the officials had turned down his request.201 Much easier for the
wounded combatants was access to the private hospitals in Turkey where official control
was limited.
Closer to reality was Chimayev’s statement about the freedom of action enjoyed
by the Chechens in Turkey. They could freely enter and leave Turkey with the
unrecognized documents issued by the self-proclaimed Dudayev’s government. Neither
was a problem about the residence permit in Turkish cities. According to mass-media
guesses there were 20.000 – 100.000 Chechens in Istanbul only.202 Although such figures
seem to be exaggerated the number of Chechens living in Turkey indeed significantly
increased once the military operations started in Chechnya. Certainly, they had not the
most kindly towards the Russian-speaking population and used the opportunity to take a
sort of revenge on Russians coming to Turkey. In other words, a small-scale criminal
activity in which some Chechen groups were involved took place mostly in the Istanbul
districts Laleli and Aksaray where the Russian tourists and suit-case traders usually
stayed. For justification it is necessary to note that Chechens were far from being the sole
criminals in those questionable quarters but their determination, strengthened by the
fighting on their native land, and the sympathy of the Turkish public granted them
relative immunity in making money out by robbing Russian-speaking visitors. Besides,
there were acts of violence performed by Chechen individuals on Russian tourists and
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suit-case traders, the majority of whom were women. Some of those cases were also
noticed in Turkish newspapers.203
 Furthermore, not only tourists but also Russian diplomats became the target of
Chechen groups’ harassment. Anxieties … were openly expressed by a Senior Councilor
of the Russian Federation, Leonid Manzashin, who said that diplomats were often
persecuted and threatened by Chechens in Istanbul streets.204
With the growth of the number of Chechens in Turkey the tension in Russo -
Turkish relations grew as well. Chechen flags raised over some buildings in Istanbul
caused another discomfort for the Russians. According to the Russian media Turkish
authorities treated anti-Russian activities too leniently and let the Chechen representative
offices openly demonstrate their banners.205 The head of the Caucasus Chechen Support
Committee Fazil Ozen, however, dismissed those statements saying that the flags were
shown by migrants from Chechnya and that there was still no a permanent Chechen
office in Ankara.206 Still, the image of Turkey as a supporter for the Chechen separatists
was quite strong in Russia.
7.2.6 Signs of improvement in mutual understanding
The Chechen issue continued to be the cause for some tension between Russia
and Turkey throughout the Federal forces’ military operation. The first sign of
improvement appeared following the cease-fire agreement between the Federal and
separatist leaders and the withdrawal of the Federal troops from Chechnya in August
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1996. Although the Turkish government welcomed the end of military actions in the
Northern Caucasus it refrained from recognition of Chechnya’s independence and
establishing diplomatic relations with the so-called Republic of Ichkeria. Later, in
October Demirel made an official visit to Moscow on the occasion of BlackSea
Economic Cooperation meeting. Before going back to Turkey Demirel met with the
Russian Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and discussed with him the matters of
concern both to Turkey and to Russia. Demirel emphasized the necessity for counter
terrorism and denounced any support and connivance in it. He also added that it would be
wrong if Russia and Turkey tried to play the Kurdish and Chechen cards against each
other. Chernomyrdin for his part said that he was perfectly aware of the sensitivity
expressed by Turkey concerning the Kurdish question and promised that Kurdish
organizations and facilities in Russia would not be tolerated.207 Those positive
developments were further strengthened by Çiller’s visit to Moscow in December 1996,
during which there was signed the Memorandum of “Understanding on the Fight Against
Terrorism.” As Olson correctly noticed that memorandum meant that both sides agreed to
renounce any kind of support for separatist movements on each other’s territory.208 Such
a step could only please Russia and Turkey because it largely reduced the Chechen and
Kurdish issues’ capacity to bring both states to the brink of a conflict.
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CHAPTER VIII
 CONCLUSION
At first glance Turkey’s attitude towards Russia during the Chechen crisis seemed
quite hostile. Military actions in Chechnya that received severe criticism from nationalist-
and religious- oriented circles in Turkey really carried the possibility of spoiling the
relations between the two states. However, due to both the Russian and the Turkish sides’
efforts that were guided not by sentiments but by a sober evaluation of the situation the
serious deterioration did not come about.
Certainly, collecting funds for the Chechen militants, providing them medical
treatment, opening pro-separatist organizations and naming streets and other places after
the Chechen leader could not please the Federal side. Therefore Moscow would several
times give a significant indication of displeasure at Turkey’s stance on Chechnya.209
Nevertheless, at the same time, taking into consideration the presence of the huge North
Caucasian diaspora on its territory, anti-Russian sentiments and the Islamic factor
Turkey’s support was still not that significant in proportion compared to the reaction of
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some other states. Here Russia’s so-called “Slavic brother” Ukraine may serve as an
example. Despite the fact that in Ukraine at least the quarter of the total population is
Russians and another quarter considers Russian as its native language, the pro-Chechen
demonstrations were at least not less frequent than in Turkey and some places in
Ukrainian towns and cities were renamed after the separatist leaders as well. For instance,
in Lvov the street that previously carried the name of Lermontov was renamed “street of
Dzhokhar Dudayev.”210 Moreover, Ukrainian mercenaries were the most numerous
among the groups of foreigners fighting on Dudayev’s side. The Ukrainian mass-media
did not even try to hide the fact of Ukrainians’ presence in Chechnya. According to the
Ukrainian newspaper the so-called representative of Ichkeria in Ukraine, Ruslan
Badayev, stated that several Ukrainian fighters were awarded “medals of honor” for their
fighting on the separatist side.211 Another newspaper claimed that almost half of the total
number of mercenaries were Ukrainians.212
Thus, although seen as Russia’s one of the most serious geopolitical rivals in the
Caucasus, Turkey did not make any concrete efforts to use the conflict in Chechnya as an
opportunity to strengthen its position in the region. Turkish officials openly stated that
Turkey was seeking cooperation rather than confrontation with its northern neighbor.213
The main reason for this were the financial benefits emanating from Russian-Turkish
economic affairs. Indeed, despite internal pressure from radical groups Turkish leaders
knew that the benefits of good relations with Russia would definitely outweigh the gains
(if any) of supporting Chechen separatists despite all promises and boastful statements by
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their leaders. For instance, during the warfare open expression of sympathies towards the
Chechen separatists by a large part of public in Turkey did not impede Turkish building
companies GAMA and ENKA from signing contracts with Moscow for the
reconstruction of Grozny.214
Certainly, cooperation between Turkey and Russia could not be limited to only
the economical dimension. If two traders expect huge profits from bilateral economic
relations but there are some geo-political barriers to that, those barriers are usually
removed. Following the 96 Memorandum Turkey and Russia signed other agreements
that were to strengthen bilateral cooperation equally in economic and geo-political areas.
The Russian-Turkish Declaration on the Fight Against Terrorism signed in November
1999 and the Action Plan for Cooperation between Russia and Turkey in Eurasia signed
in November 2001 demonstrated both states’ willingness and determination to cooperate
fruitfully in all fields. The effects of such cooperation on the Chechen issue were
perceptible when Ecevit government limited the activities of pro-separatist organizations
and restricted their ability to raise funds by closing their bank accounts.215
Public opinion in Turkey towards the Chechen case also started to change when
the Turkish people got to know better what actually separatist Chechnya really was about.
Following the cease-fire agreement in 1996 and the withdrawal of Federal troops
Chechnya as in the time of Dudayev was again the place where no one was protected
from arbitrary violence and kidnapping for ransom was the primary business.
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Maskhadov, who won the presidential elections in Chechnya in 1997 proved to be a poor
administrator and law-enforcer and was unable to do anything with the gangs that starting
from the end of 1996 to October 1999 kidnapped more than 1.100 people including
journalists, missionaries and businessmen from different countries.216 Turkey was no
exception and its citizens got an opportunity to feel the “gratitude” of the Chechen
separatists for the assistance during the warfare when three Turkish businessmen that
went to Chechnya to invest in its economy were kidnapped and faced demands for
ransom from their families.217 Furthermore, the hostage-taking incident at Swissotel in
Istanbul further alienated Turkish public opinion from Chechnya. As the ambassador of a
leading western state correctly noticed “[T]he Chechens hardly had many friends in the
world. And with this move, they will be getting adverse reactions also in Turkey where
they had enjoyed a relatively warm and friendly climate.”218 As a result, in marked
contrast to the situation in the first conflict, the second military campaign in Chechnya
that was provoked by the Chechen Wahhabis’ attack on Daghestan did not cause mass
indignation in Turkey and public opinion in Reynolds’s words was “apathetic to the
Chechen cause.”219
After all, it can be said that although with some difficulties Russia and Turkey
managed to overcome the barrier represented by the Chechen issue in their relations due
to their interdependence and the common attributes in their geopolitical structure. And
there is a hope that mutual understanding in resolving such problems would lead to the
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multidimensional partnership that in turn would enable both states to, in Nabi Şensoy’s
words, “play a crucial role in disproving the existence of a so-called clash of civilizations,
or between Islam and Christianity.”220
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